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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis considers the implications of relational theory for doctrinal debates in Canadian 
and American constitutional equality law, with a focus on grounds of discrimination and suspect 
classification.  Chapter 1 sets out the fundamentals of feminist relational theory, emphasizing 
relational approaches to difference, equality, and rights.  Chapter 2 considers the methodological 
implications of applying relational theory to doctrinal problems.  Chapter 3 sets out the basic 
structure and evolution of the suspect classification inquiry in American equal protection law.  
Chapter 4 does the same in respect of the Canadian doctrinal approach to grounds of unconstitutional 
discrimination.  Finally Chapter 5 ties together Canadian and American scholarly debates over the 
proper shape of inquiries into groups/grounds or class(ification), and suggests a framework by which 
the relational theory set out in Chapter 1 might help to reframe and resolve aspects of these problems 
as they emerge in both jurisdictions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This summer, the United States Supreme Court struck down a section of the federal Defence 
of Marriage Act (DOMA) that excluded same-sex couples from the definition of “spouse” in 
construing federal statutes.1  The Court heard vigorous argument in that case as to whether same-sex 
couples were part of a group in need of special protection under the constitution’s Equal Protection 
Clause.  Even the President weighed in.2  But not the Supreme Court.  The Court struck down the 
DOMA exclusion, but sidestepped a wide-open question about whether distinctions on the basis of 
sexual orientation warrant special scrutiny.3    
Two years earlier, in 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether Ontario’s 
Agricultural Employees Protection Act (AEPA), which provided agricultural workers with lesser 
labour rights than other employees in Ontario, was vulnerable to challenge under Canada’s 
constitutional equality provision.  Extensive arguments were made before the Supreme Court 
regarding whether agricultural workers were a group warranting protection under Canada’s 
constitutional equality protection.  The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, however, 
                                               
1 United States v Windsor, 570 US ___ (2013) [Windsor]. 
2 See Attorney General Eric Holder’s letter to Speaker John Boehner of February 12, 2013, expressing the 
President’s considered view that the Court should be “suspicious of classifications based on sexual 
orientation.”  Available online at <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html>.  (Accessed 
June 29, 2013.)   
3 William J. Rich describes the U.S. courts’ current approach to equal protection analysis in cases of alleged 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, noting throughout that the Supreme Court has yet to address 
the requisite level of scrutiny.  William J. Rich, Modern Constitutional Law, 3d ed (Minnesota: West, 2011) at 
Chapter 13.  Rich further observes that in the most recent (as of the time of writing) Supreme Court case where 
the Court was called upon to address the question, the Court declined to do so, deeming the question 
unnecessary: Romer v Evans, 517 US 620 (1996). 
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demurred, declining to address the equality claim on the basis that it was too early to address the 
impact of the newly-implemented scheme.     
Writing in the U.S. context, Professor Kenji Yoshino has suggested that the United States 
Supreme Court is increasingly reluctant to address thorny questions as to which groups warrant 
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.4  Yoshino argues that the Court increasingly 
prefers to adjudicate cases in other ways – to protect the rights of marginalized people through 
doctrinal avenues that do not require uncomfortable inquiries about social groups or grounds of 
discrimination.  These inquiries, he argues, have provoked a “pluralism anxiety”—a fear of endlessly 
proliferating groups clamouring for special protection.  The Court assuages this anxiety not by 
revising their approach to equal protection—an approach that begins by asking whether a “suspect 
classification” is engaged—but by turning away from equal protection altogether.  Yoshino’s 
descriptive claim is convincing, and by his own admission less forcefully advanced than his weaker 
normative proposition: maybe this is a good thing.  Maybe the universalizing language of human 
rights is the best tonic for a pluralism-anxious Court –the best way of moving towards a “new, 
broader sense of ‘we.’”5 
 But there are risks—Yoshino concedes—of turning away from the real circumstances of 
particular groups, away from the bodies and communities that give substance to the pluralism that 
makes the Court so anxious.  There is a risk that pluralism anxiety is standing in the way of 
protecting groups that really need the protection of heighted judicial scrutiny.6  There is a risk that 
shifting to the universalizing language of basic rights encourages us to ignore or minimize instances 
                                               
4 See generally Kenji Yoshino, “The New Equal Protection” (2011) 124 Harv L Rev 747. 
5 Ibid at 792-793, quoting Robert D Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) at 139. 
6 Yoshino, supra note 4 at 797. 
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of group-based subordination that warrant judicial intervention.7  And, there is a risk that such an 
approach will require oppressed groups to chip away at oppressive structures in a piecemeal 
fashion—one infringement at a time—without recourse to broader arguments about systemic 
subordination.8     
 While Yoshino is examining a particular doctrinal turn in the U.S. context, a related set of 
trends may be emerging in the jurisprudence of the Canadian Supreme Court.  The Canadian Court’s 
early approach to grounds of discrimination was focused on group disadvantage and contextual 
analysis.  The Court has since shifted to an approach that hinges on an abstract and decontextualized 
inquiry into whether the personal characteristics that define potential claimant groups are impossible 
or difficult to change.  Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has declined to add a single ground 
to the list of protected traits in nearly 15 years.9  Whether or not this shift is motivated by the same 
“pluralism anxiety” that Yoshino attributes to the U.S. Supreme Court, the result may be the same:  
when it comes to constitutional equality protection, new groups need not apply.   
Finding A Way Out of the Groups/Grounds Problem 
In her broad thematic study of equality laws across a range of jurisdictions, Sandra Fredman 
identifies the question of “which characteristics…ought to be protected against discrimination?” as 
one of two central scope-limiting questions posed by laws aiming to combat discrimination.10  
Fredman identifies a typology of three basic textual structures of equality laws: (1) protections based 
on an exhaustive list of grounds, such as those found in the United Kingdom and the European 
                                               
7 Ibid at 798-799. 
8 Ibid at 799-800. 
9 No new grounds have been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada as being “analogous” to those listed 
in the constitutional text since Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 
203 [Corbiere], as will be discussed more fully below. 
10 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 107. The second limiting 
principle identified by Fredman concerns the “reach” of equality law: “Should discrimination on these grounds 
be unlawful in all walks of life, or only in specific spheres such as employment and education?”  Ibid at 107. 
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Union; (2) protections based on a non-exhaustive list that can be expanded by judicial interpretation, 
such as those found in Canada, South Africa, and the European Commission; and (3) open-textured 
provisions that offer no list of prohibited distinctions, such as the United States’ Equal Protection 
Clause.11  Even where no list is provided in the constitutional text, however, Courts continue to rely 
on such classifications in interpreting and limiting equality guarantees. The American Equal 
Protection Clause, for example, has been interpreted through a rubric of judicially prescribed “tiers of 
scrutiny,” whereby certain “suspect classifications” give rise to “heightened scrutiny.” 
Although “grounds” and “classifications” are broadly present in legal tests for equality 
violations, debate persists as to which grounds warrant protection, and why. In interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court of the United States has limited “heightened scrutiny” to 
distinctions on the basis of race, national origin, alienage, sex, and nonmarital parentage.12  By 
contrast, the South African constitutional text sets out 16 distinct grounds of proscribed 
discrimination, to which the South African Constitutional Court has made further judicial additions.13  
In those jurisdictions that do allow for judicial expansion of the list of prohibited grounds, debate 
continues as to the types of questions equality analysis should ask about equality claimants: do the 
proper questions about claimants inquire into the mutability or relevancy of a defining trait, or do 
they inquire into the political history and status of the claimant group?14 
 Thus the two cases that introduced this paper—the American DOMA challenge and the 
Canadian AEPA challenge—gave rise to a common set of questions despite their different 
                                               
11 Ibid at 107-130. 
12  I will use the term “heightened scrutiny” to refer to both “suspect” and “quasi-suspect” classifications—a 
distinction which will be elaborated more fully below. 
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 9.  See Hoffmann v South African Airways, 2000 (2) 
SA 628; 2001 (10) BHRC 571; (2000) 3 CHRLD 146 for the South African Constitutional Court’s judicial 
addition of HIV status as a protected ground. 
14 Fredman, supra note 10 at 107-130.  
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jurisdictional, political, and material contexts.  Do laws targeting or disadvantaging American same-
sex couples, or Canadian agricultural workers, engage the special purposes of constitutional equality 
protections?  Are these cases sufficiently “like” or “analogous” to the paradigmatic grounds of 
discrimination such as race to warrant special constitutional protection?15  How much choice do 
agricultural workers or same-sex couples have over these aspects of their lives and identities?  Are 
American same-sex couples or Canadian agricultural workers the victims of present-day or historical 
disadvantage?  Are there factors which make either of these groups less able to represent themselves 
in the democratic political process? 
 In both Canada and the U.S., scholarly debates have zeroed in on a key distinction in the 
potential approaches to these persistent doctrinal problems: should constitutional equality analysis 
focus on groups of persons or on the nature of the grounds of distinction that delineate those groups.  
Returning to the paradigmatic case of racial discrimination against African Americans,16 this 
question asks whether the relevant equality problem is best understood with reference to the 
circumstances of African Americans, or if it is best understood with reference to the nature of race as 
a trait.  In the Canadian context, Daphne Gilbert has called for a doctrinal emphasis on disadvantaged 
groups (rather than abstracted grounds) as the best way to account for discrimination in the face of 
complex identity.17  Dianne Pothier, on the contrary, has called for an emphasis on the listed grounds 
                                               
15 Writing in the U.S. context, Jed Rubenfeld describes racial discrimination against African Americans as the 
paradigmatic wrong against which the Equal Protection Clause is aimed: “If the Equal Protection Clause 
means anything, it means that the black codes, separate but equal laws, and racial miscegenation statutes were 
unconstitutional.  Equal protection jurisprudence is centrally a task of saying what it means to honor the 
nation’s commitment to abolish all such laws.  Any reading of the Equal Protection Clause that does not 
accord these paradigm cases pride of place—any interpretation that cannot, without bending or breaking, 
embrace these paradigm cases at its core—is not a satisfactory account.”  Jed Rubenfeld, “Affirmative Action” 
(1997) 107 Yale LJ 427 at 457. 
16 See ibid for Rubenfeld’s discussion of racial discrimination against African Americans as forming the 
“paradigm cases” of equal protection violations. 
17 See generally Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48 McGill 
LJ 627 [Gilbert, “Regroup”]; and Daphne Gilbert, “Unequaled: Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé’s Vision of 
Equality and Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 15 CJWL 1 [Gilbert, “Unequaled”]. 
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as the specific, historically important fault lines of discriminatory treatment.18  In the American 
context, Reginald Oh and Jed Rubenfeld have decried the U.S. Supreme Court’s linguistic and 
substantive shift from a focus on “suspect classes” to a preoccupation with “suspect classifications” 
as a betrayal of the demands of anti-subordination.19  But others have rejected calls for attention to 
“classes” or “groups” on the basis that such approaches may work to entrench stereotypical and self-
fulfilling accounts of group difference.20  
 This paper seeks a “way out” of these intractable groups/grounds debates.  In this paper I 
consider a means of attending to the oppressive relationships that give discrimination its bite, while 
avoiding the spectre of a Pandora’s box of variously labelled “groups” clamouring for inclusion on 
an ossified and stereotypical “list.”  This way out is one that feminists have been working on for 
years under the banner of “relational theory,” a body of scholarship that will be fleshed out in the 
coming pages.  Its solutions are both simple and paradigm-shifting: attend to relationships in all their 
complexity; interrogate the categories with which people are described; listen across difference.  But, 
as will be elaborated below, these relational directives have often faltered on the shoals of legal 
doctrine.  The turn away from categorical thinking, in particular, seems at times to ask too much of a 
legal culture that knows no other way. 
 In this paper, I seek to explore the contributions that relational insights might make to a 
pervasive and persistent doctrinal problem: what is equality law to do with all these groups, and how 
                                               
18 Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 
CJWL 37. 
19 See Reginald C Oh, “A Critical Linguistic Analysis of Equal Protection Doctrine: Are Whites a Suspect 
Class” (2004) 13 Temp Pol & Civ Rts L Rev 583; and Rubenfeld, supra note 15. 
20 See, for example, Richard Thompson Ford, “Unnatural Groups: A Reaction to Owen Fiss’s ‘Groups and the 
Equal Protection Clause’” (2003) 2:1 Issues in Legal Scholarship 1007; Iris Marion Young, “Status Inequality 
and Social Groups” (2002) 2:1 Issues in Legal Scholarship 1019; and Rogers M Smith, “‘Black’ and ‘White’ 
in Brown: Equal Protection and the Legal Construction of Racial Identities” (2003) 2:1 Issues in Legal 
Scholarship 1014. 
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is equality law to assess which grounds of distinction should also be seen as grounds of 
discrimination? 
Summary and Roadmap 
In Chapter 1 (“Relational Rights”), I set out the fundamentals of feminist relational theory, 
with a particular focus on relational approaches to difference, equality, and rights.  In Chapter 2 
(“Embracing an Uneasy Fit”), I consider the methodological implications of applying relational 
theory to doctrinal problems.  In Chapter 3 (“Classes and Classifications in U.S. Equal Protection 
Law”), I set out the basic structure and evolution of the suspect classification inquiry in American 
equal protection law.  In Chapter 4 (“Groups and Grounds in Canadian Equality Law”), I do the same 
in respect of the Canadian doctrinal approach to grounds of unconstitutional discrimination.  Finally, 
in Chapter 5 (“Rethinking Class(ification): Relational Approaches to Doctrine”), I revisit the problem 
of the groups/grounds debates set out in this introduction.  In this chapter, I seek to tie together 
Canadian and American scholarly debates over the proper shape of the inquiry into groups/grounds 
or class(ifications), and suggest that relational theory might help to reframe and resolve aspects of 
these problems as they emerge in both jurisdictions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
RELATIONAL RIGHTS 
 
Robert Leckey rightly notes that “Relational theory is not an officially constituted school, and 
its boundaries are contestable.”21  Yet common threads are discernable among relational theorists—
threads comprised of common cosmological and epistemological claims, methodological 
prescriptions, and normative commitments.  Pared down to its most basic premise, relational theory 
calls for a shift in emphasis—moving relationships from the periphery to the centre of legal and 
social discourse and reasoning.  Importantly, this call for a “shift” acknowledges that relational 
theory is in important ways a reaction to extant framings, rather than a “grand theory” purporting to 
be spun from whole cloth.22  In particular, social relations theorists take to task traditional liberal 
assumptions about persons as autonomous, rational, and independent political actors.  Instead, 
relational theorists posit that relationships are constitutive of persons and institutions—a position 
which in turn gives rise to a normative demand that problems be reconceived and addressed in ways 
that honor this core truth.  To this end, social relations theorists have worked to build up new 
metaphorical, rhetorical, political and legal alternatives to the paradigmatic liberal account, in order 
                                               
21 Robert Leckey, Contextual Subjects: Family, State and Relational Theory (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2008) at 7.  Leckey describes relational theory as consisting of three main schools: one which 
emphasizes differences between men and women, and the ethics of care relationships; another which analyzes 
rights as relational; and a third which focuses on elaborating relational conceptions of autonomy.  The 
relational theory I discuss here is primarily focused on the second of these (relational rights), but with 
references to the other two schools where necessary to elaborate relational rights. 
22 See Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991) at 15. 
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to correct this failure and to adequately account for the centrality of relationships to political and 
legal questions.   
This chapter will set out the central arguments proposed by relational theorists, as well as 
certain relevant points of contestation, with an eye to exhuming relational theorists’ critiques and 
prescriptions for revising liberal theory, equality, law, and rights.  In this chapter, I will emphasize 
two core elements of relational theory, most persuasively described by Jennifer Nedelsky and Martha 
Minow respectively.  The first is a portrait of human persons as embodied, affective, and essentially 
constituted by social relationships—a distinct departure from classical liberal conceptions of legal 
personhood.  The second is an emphasis on the socially constructed and contested deployment of 
categories, and an attendant wariness of categorical thinking that purports to rely on natural 
groupings.  This discussion will conclude that relational theorists have posed important critiques of 
the liberal assumptions that animate constitutional equality doctrines, but will also observe that 
prescriptive links between these criticisms and particular equality projects remain largely uncharted 
or contested.  I take Christine Koggel’s development of a relational approach to equality as a largely 
unsuccessful effort to forge such a link.  I propose that one source of difficulty in inscribing equality 
law projects with relational theory is the admittedly “uneasy fit” between relational theory and 
doctrinal approaches—most evident in Minow’s explicit rejection of doctrinal analysis as a means of 
exploring relational approaches to legal reasoning.  In the following chapter, I will elaborate my 
reasons for pursuing the link between relational theory and doctrinal projects despite Minow’s 
critique and my own concession of an “uneasy fit.” 
From Liberal Individuals to Relational Selves 
Relational theorists share a common concern that traditional liberal theory rests on an 
erroneous assumption that human persons should be understood as independent, atomistic, rational 
units.  Leckey summarizes that “[a]ccording to relational theory, liberals conceive of the subject as 
10 
 
an autonomous, rational agent that selects its relationships and obligations through the instruments of 
private property and contract.”23  Thus, writing in the family law context, Martha Minow and Mary 
Lyndon Shanley describe a liberal, contractarian “model of the individual” which casts the human 
self as “that of a self-possessing individual linked to others only by agreement.”24  Relational 
theorists elaborate that these liberal assumptions about the independence of individuals give rise to 
particular analytical and prescriptive approaches that affirm and perpetuate the image of a separate 
self.  Lorraine Code describes the liberal premise of separable individuals as directing that 
“[a]utonomous man is—and should be—self-sufficient, independent, and self-reliant, a self-realizing 
individual who directs his efforts towards maximizing his personal gains.”25  In the same vein, 
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar emphasize the link between the descriptive and prescriptive 
in the liberal formulation that “human beings are capable of leading self-sufficient, isolated, 
independent lives,” and that therefore “the goal of human life is the realization of self-sufficiency and 
individuality.”26  Martha Minow similarly traces liberalism’s descriptive and prescriptive 
dimensions, charging that liberalism both “assumed and claimed to create the conditions for 
autonomous, self-determining individuals.”27  The atomistic individual of liberal theory, on Minow’s 
account, “is thought to have wants, desires, and needs independent of social context, relationships 
with others, or historical setting.  The individual, in short, is distinguishable from his or her situation 
                                               
23 Leckey, supra note 21 at 106. 
24 Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, “Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in 
Liberal Political Theory and Law” (1996) 11:1 Hypatia 4 at 12. 
25 Lorraine Code, “Second Persons” in What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of 
Knowledge (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991) at 78.  
26 Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, “Introduction: Autonomy Refigured” in Catriona Mackenzie & 
Natalie Stoljar, eds, Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 6. 
27 Minow, supra note 22 at 124. 
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and social, political, and religious identities.  This idea is a prerequisite for imagining a state of 
nature, outside of society, from which people enter into a social contract.”28 
Jennifer Nedelsky offers a sustained and persuasive version of this critique in Law’s Relations: A 
Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law.  Nedelsky links the particular atomistic vision of the 
individual to the central role that metaphors of “boundary” have played in Anglo-American law.29  
Nedelsky underlines the historical reality that protection of property was a core concern of the early 
American democratic project, given the material context of pervasive economic inequality.  The 
founders worried that “property would be inherently vulnerable in a republic because the many 
would always be poor and the few rich; what would prevent the many from using their numerical 
power in the legislature to take the property of the few?”30  The framers presumed that “it was in the 
very nature of a productive system of private property that many, perhaps most, would have none,” 
and that this reality was both natural and fearsome for the new republic.31  Indeed, on Nedelsky’s 
account, the survival of the republic was seen to hinge on this problem, with the result that protection 
of property “became the defining instance of the larger problem of securing rights against the threat 
of majority oppression.”32  Distortions emerged as a result of this casting of “the general problem in 
terms of the particular,” which Nedelsky believes persist in both popular and legal thinking today.33  
In particular, rather than seeing rights as being subject to ongoing, collective definition, rights came 
to be understood as “things to be protected.”34  The ensuing metaphor of rights as “boundaries” of 
legitimate power thus “not only has the dark underpinning of inequality but also rests on a flawed 
                                               
28 Minow, supra note 22 at 152. 
29 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) at Chapter 2. 
30 Ibid at 93. 
31 Ibid at 94. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid at 95. 
34 Ibid at 96. 
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conception of the individual, a conception captured, amplified, and entrenched by its association with 
property.  The boundaries central to American constitutionalism are those necessary to protect a 
bounded or ‘separative’ self: the boundaries around selves form the boundaries to state power.”35 
Relational theorists propose that liberal legal and political theory are wrong about the nature 
of human persons and community, and that the metaphorical structure of separation and boundary are 
inadequate and distorting.  On the relational account, the autonomous, independent, self-actualizing 
rights-bearer is a fiction, and a dangerous fiction at that.  Nedelsky argues that the “perverse quality” 
of boundary metaphors that cast political projects in terms of protecting separative selves from 
intrusions of the collective “is clearest when taken to its extreme: the most perfectly autonomous man 
is the most perfectly isolated.”36  Moreover, a focus on boundary distracts from “the true sources and 
consequences of the patterns of power that property [and other boundaries] constitut[e].”37  The 
alleged distortion and misdirection attending liberal notions of separative selves is thus deeply 
political.  Catherine Albertyn and Beth Goldblatt set out the core concern that “the twin concepts of 
abstract individualism and legal neutrality mask a complex reality of inequality in which people have 
unequal access to resources and many do not have sufficient power to control or value their own 
lives.”38   
This relational critique of liberal individualism draws heavily on a broader feminist and 
social criticism that Marilyn Friedman characterizes (with tongue in cheek) as casting individualism 
as “the evil demon of modern Western social and political life.”39  The essence of the feminist charge 
                                               
35 Ibid.   
36 Ibid at 97. 
37 Ibid at 108. 
38 Catherine Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (1998) 14:2 SAJHR 248 at 251. 
39 Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 16.  Friedman 
is concerned that “[i]n an effort to combat individualism, critics may shift theoretically too far toward social 
terms of conceptualization and ignore dimensions of autonomy that are not specifically social.”   
13 
 
is that the abstracted individual of liberal political and legal theory is not a truly abstract, but is rather 
a caricature of masculine and historically contingent ideals.  The caricature’s particularity is masked 
by liberalism’s claim to abstraction.  Minow points out that “[t]he very human being who could be 
imagined as abstracted from context is a particular sort of person with a specific history and identity.  
It is a person living some time after the seventeenth century in western Europe or the United States, a 
person who avoided feudal bonds and lived away from any religious, ethnic, or family group whose 
members defined themselves through such a group.”40  Minow notes that philosophers have come to 
question “whether the abstract individual ever did or ever could apply to women,”41 and adds her 
own observation that “it is difficult to imagine that such a person would be…a child, or a disabled 
individual.”42  Christine Koggel posits that “[t]here is no impartial and neutral point of view removed 
from the perspectives of concrete persons embedded in social practices and political contexts.” 43  In 
elaborating the danger of such claims to impartiality, Koggel adopts the argument of feminist 
judgment theorist Seyla Benhabib, that efforts to arrive at principles through reference to de-
historicized and de-particularized human selves inevitably do so “surreptitiously by identifying the 
experiences of a specific group of subjects as the paradigmatic case of the human as such.  These 
subjects are invariably white, male adults who are propertied or at least professional.”44  The 
fictitious liberal rights-bearer is thus seen to replicate, perpetuate, and mask oppressive power 
                                               
40 Minow, supra note 22 at 153. 
41 Ibid at 153; citing, inter alia, Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (New Jersey: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1983) at 46-47; Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1979) at 197-202; Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western 
Philosophy (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
42 Minow, supra note 22 at 153, fn 15. 
43 Christine M Koggel, Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory (Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1997) at 113. 
44 Koggel, supra note 43 at 105, citing Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and 
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992) at 152-153. 
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structures that marginalize those who least accord with a propertied-white-male norm—a norm for 
which he serves as both guardian and exemplar.     
In contrast to the liberal paradigm, relational theorists hold that social relationships are 
constitutive of human personhood.  Leckey explains that “relational theorists understand that subjects 
are socially constituted, embedded in their contexts, their selfhood and agency formed by thick 
relationships with others.”45  Thus, Anne Donchin explains, “[i]nterconnections continue to shape 
and define us throughout our lifetime, so that patterns through which we construct (and reconstruct) 
our self-identity and infuse it with meanings are bound up with meanings given in the social world 
external to us.”46  On this account, the isolated, abstract individual of liberal theory misrepresents the 
essentially social nature of real persons.  Everything about who we are, what we need, what we are 
capable of, and what we aspire to, emerges from the dense networks of social relationships in which 
we are not just embedded, but also generated and regenerated through ongoing and iterative 
interactions.  Mackenzie and Stoljar describe relational approaches as being based on the “shared 
conviction that persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the 
context of social relationships shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, 
class, gender, and ethnicity.”47  Thus, instead of viewing individuals as separate and atomistic actors 
whose interactions are relevant only when their interests collide, Nedelsky proposes that “each 
individual is in basic ways constituted by networks of relationships,” ranging from the intimate and 
interpersonal—such as those with parents, friends, or lovers—to the systemic—such as the 
relationship between citizen and state, or the relations entailed by “being participants in a global 
economy, migrants in a world of gross economic inequality, inhabitants of a world shaped by global 
                                               
45 Leckey, supra note 21 at 106. 
46 Anne Donchin, “Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandaries in Genetic Decision-Making” in Mackenzie & 
Stoljar, eds, supra note 26 at 239-240. 
47 Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 26 at 4. 
15 
 
warming.”48 These various levels of relationship operate concurrently and interactively to constitute 
human subjects, who in turn contribute to the structure and content of those same relationships.49   
Categorically Different: Relational Conceptions of Difference and Identity 
The relational contention that the paradigmatic, isolated individual of liberal theory is in fact 
particular and historical destabilizes a host of related assumptions.  Once we accept the relational 
premise that there is no possibility of an unsituated perspective, all sorts of liberal intuitions about the 
meaning of difference, the concerns relevant to adjudicating disputes, and who exactly has produced 
and perpetuated these intuitions are opened up to debate. 
Martha Minow’s Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law takes 
up a version of this problem.  In Minow’s view, legal analysis often seeks to “break complicated 
perceptions into discrete items or traits,” and then sort those traits or items into categories – often 
without interrogating the provenance of those categories.50  Minow’s core claim is that “we make a 
mistake when we assume that the categories we use for analysis just exist and simply sort our 
experiences, perceptions, and problems through them.”51  Minow emphasizes that acts of 
categorization are in fact social choices that ascribe and perpetuate meanings and consequences for 
those traits that we choose to make significant.52  The persistent presumption that such categories of 
difference are real or unconstructed “ignores the power of our language, which embeds unstated 
points of comparison inside categories that falsely imply a natural fit with the world.”53  Minow does 
not deny that there are real differences between people, but rather emphasizes that the categories by 
which we describe and assign meaning to these differences are not given.  When we ignore the 
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chosen and situated nature of categories like race, sex, or disability, we run the risk that “the labels 
point to conclusions about where an item, or an individual, belongs without opening for debate the 
purposes for which the label will be used.”54  In response to this problem, Minow advocates a “social 
relations approach,” which requires “a shift from a focus on the distinctions between people to a 
focus on the relationships within which we notice and draw distinctions.”55  Endorsing Minow’s 
critique, Albertyn and Goldblatt suggest that “[i]t is not the characteristics of the individual or the 
group that are the concern, but the social arrangements that make these matter.”56  
Christine Koggel’s Perspectives on Equality: Constructing a Relational Theory is premised 
on the related proposition that language and meaning are forged in particular social contexts, and are 
shaped by purpose-driven interactions.  Koggel illustrates this point drawing on Wittgenstein’s later 
work, in which language games are used “to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of 
application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words.”57  In 
one language game, Wittgenstein describes a team of builders who employ purposive and socially 
prescribed definitions of similarity and difference in order to communicate requests to bring over 
objects defined as “blocks,” “pillars,” “slabs” or “beams.”58  The meanings of these terms are defined 
by their use, and disputes over which objects fall in which categories can be resolved through 
reference to agreed-upon standards and rules for application.59  Koggel seeks to expand (and perhaps 
depart from) Wittgenstein’s language game to include moral concepts and behaviour, with a focus on 
equality: “What happens when the builders learn to group people on the basis of features they are 
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judged to have in common and to follow rules that prescribe treatment for members of those 
groups”?60  For example, Koggel asks what we might make of a situation where Builder A asks 
Builder B to bring “two slabs”; Builder B returns with two slabs (the correct number of the correct 
object), but the slabs are rejected because Builder B is a woman.  Builder A’s refusal is based on 
another rule regarding a shared category of meaning: that “woman” means “nonbuilding person.”61  
Koggel is interested in the implications of this use of descriptive features of persons as a basis for 
prescriptive treatment.62  Koggel explains that “[w]hat is disturbing about the builder who identifies 
women for the purpose of excluding them from the activity of building is that the category…and the 
rule…determine the meaning of difference in ways that specify and circumscribe activities, roles and 
relationships.”63  Koggel worries that Builder B may come to “accept these descriptions of what her 
difference means, not perceive herself as a builder, and never challenge the description of her as a 
non-builder,” or alternatively, she may believe herself to be capable of building, “but have no power 
to change the meaning of her difference in the context of an established practice that excludes her 
from building.”64  Builder B’s choices for interacting, participating, and acting are limited by the 
entrenched descriptive and prescriptive dimensions of categories.65   
Koggel rejects the proposition that descriptions are merely “nominal” in the sense of 
representing purely arbitrary conventions; but she also rejects the proposition that they are 
“descriptive facts” in the sense that they are determined by universal categories “under which 
particulars fall independently of human interpretation.”66  In Koggel’s relational approach, 
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“categories that group objects capture features in and facts about the world, but those features and 
facts reflect and rely on human interpretation and interaction.”67  Koggel thus seeks to focus on 
category as an activity rather than a structure with independent existence.68  Koggel emphasizes that 
she does not mean to imply that there are no “real” differences between people, but rather that the 
fact of these differences “does not adequately explain the close connection that obtains between 
categories and the purposeful functions for which people create and use categories, purposes which 
lead them to focus on some features and to ignore others.”69  Koggel urges a focus on the social 
contexts within which categories are constructed for “particular purposes,” and attention to the 
“moral and political implications of ‘describing people.’”70   
For both Koggel and Minow, questions about who has the power to describe are of central 
importance to understanding and overcoming the oppressive potential of categories.  For Minow, 
claims to knowledge of who or what counts as different should be “assessed in light of power 
relationships between those assigning the labels and those receiving them” so that “the meaning of 
differences may become a subject of debate rather than an observable ‘fact.’”71  In Minow’s view, 
attention to social relationships “should alert a decision-maker to the power expressed in the process 
of categorizing people, or problems.”72  Koggel similarly emphasizes that identification of 
“difference” is, as a matter of logic, defined in comparison with a standard, and that those standards 
are “created and maintained by members who have the power to identify and assign meanings to 
difference and the authority to apply and maintain the rules for use.”73  But when a language of 
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difference successfully takes hold, “norms and purposes become so much a part of the background 
that they are taken for granted and hidden.”74  In Koggel’s view, “[t]o be complete, a theory of 
equality must take on the task of uncovering and evaluating who or what counts as equal, for what 
purposes, and in what sorts of relationships.”75  The political project of opening discursive space for 
voices traditionally marginalized from the construction of difference thus becomes crucial to 
relational prescriptive projects, as will be discussed more fully below.   
Relational Values: Reconceiving Equality 
The cosmological claim that human beings are relationally constituted (what Leckey refers to as 
the “descriptive premise” of relational theory76) gives rise to a relational imperative to reconceive of 
core values in terms which comport with this central truism of relational projects.   Nedelsky explains 
that “[a] distorted picture of the self is likely to generate a distorted understanding of autonomy [and 
other values], and a system of rights designed to promote and protect that vision of self and 
autonomy is unlikely to optimally foster and protect human capacities, needs and entitlements.”77  A 
relational turn in our conception of selfhood thus requires recognition that “[a]ll core values, such as 
security, dignity, equality, liberty, freedom of speech, are made possible by (or undermined by) 
structures of relationships.”78   
The most prevalent focus of these efforts to reconstruct values in relational terms is the 
disassociation of “autonomy” from its conventional liberal associations with “independence,” “self-
determination,” or “control.”79  Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar explain that relational 
feminist responses seek to destabilize a crude liberal conception of autonomy that is “inherently 
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masculinist, that it is inextricably bound up with masculine character ideals, with assumptions about 
selfhood and agency that are metaphysically, epistemologically, and ethically problematic from a 
feminist perspective.”80  To this end, Mackenzie and Stoljar explain, relational accounts “focus 
attention on the need for a more fine-grained and richer account of the autonomous agent,” and a 
consequent conception of “autonomy as a characteristic of agents who are emotional, embodied, 
desiring, creative, and feeling, as well as rational, creatures.”81  Thus, Leckey explains, “[f]or the 
relational theorist, autonomy is not a capacity that can be exercised in isolation.”82  Nedelsky 
elaborates that autonomy is not best understood “as a static presumption about human nature, but a 
capacity whose realization is ever shifting” in relation to “the inherently fluid and contingent 
dynamics of process and relationship.”83  As Ann Donchin explains, such an approach emphasizes 
that even “the subject-centred activities of reflecting, planning, choosing, and deciding that enter into 
self-determination are social activities in both a subjective and objective sense.”84  This is truly the 
tip of the iceberg of a rich and complex literature exploring feminist and relational accounts of 
autonomy.85   
 Equality is significantly less widely theorized in the relational literature.  Nonetheless, the 
value of equality emerges repeatedly in the relational literature, alongside calls to avoid or minimize 
oppressive power relationships.86  But the precise contours of relational equality—particularly as a 
legal or constitutional construction, as will be addressed below—remain contested and unclear.  
Nedelsky, for example, advises that she “presupposes a commitment to equality,”87 but concedes that 
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she “does not try to answer all the questions of exactly what equality should look like.”88  Nedelsky 
does elaborate some of what she sees as important about equality: while hierarchies of power may be 
inevitable, relations of domination run afoul of relational commitments to equality.89  This 
juxtaposition of hierarchy and domination takes its content from the familiar commitment to equal 
concern and respect: “those who find themselves at some times and spheres of their lives at the lower 
end of a hierarchical relationship need not feel humiliated, inadequate, or otherwise unable to claim 
respect as equal members of society.”90  Contrasting her project with Koggel’s, Nedelsky elaborates 
that her own “argument is not about the relational meaning of equality as such, but over and over 
again it is about how to make a value like autonomy actually equally available to all.”91  
 For her part, Koggel’s central project in Perspectives on Equality is an exploration of the 
question “[w]hat happens when we take the inherent sociality and interdependence of human beings 
as the starting point for theorizing about conditions for treating people with equal concern and 
respect?”92  Koggel takes equality as her primary focus, despite feminist concerns about the utility 
and value of the language of “equality” in describing feminist and other justice aspirations.  Koggel 
synthesizes the feminist objection as follows: “if the goal of equality means giving up differences and 
embracing the same values and aspirations as men, then the goal needs to be questioned and even 
abandoned.”93  Feminists including Merle Thornton, Catharine MacKinnon, and Ann Scales have 
argued respectively that the rhetoric of equality has been “stretched beyond its usefulness”; a 
distraction from a proper focus on “dominance”; and likely to trap us in “interminable and diseased 
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issues of difference between the sexes.”94  Koggel, however, insists that there is value in pursuing the 
language of equality.  She proposes that the alternative approaches proposed by these and other 
theorists (Thornton’s focus on liberation; Elizabeth Gross’ autonomy; MacKinnon’s domination; and 
Karen Offen’s preference for equity over equality) in fact rely on “the logic of equality discourse” to 
the extent that they “assume agreement that women’s inequalities in power, in autonomy, in 
opportunities, and so forth, are unjust.”95  From a more practical standpoint, Koggel argues that there 
are strategic advantages to “working within the accepted discourse and structures to effect change”; 
the prevalence of the language of equality and equal treatment thus creates an incentive to find a way 
to make this discourse work.96  In Koggel’s view, equality can be saved by recasting it as relational 
and substantive rather than purely formal.97 
Perhaps the relational theoretical focus on autonomy represents a preference for values that 
don’t share equality’s connotations of comparison and difference.  Koggel, however, tackles the 
problem of relational equality head-on, seeking to infuse liberal conceptions of equality with 
relational concerns.  She explains her starting point in liberal theory on the basis that liberalism is the 
primary “focal point” around which theorists have analyzed equality.98  She endorses liberalism’s 
departure from an Aristotelian conception of “treating likes alike” within a system where morally 
relevant differences are accepted between human persons.  Koggel adopts liberalism’s “central 
insight” that “[i]f the process of treating like cases alike is to have any moral substance, it must rest 
on the fundamental requirement that each person be treated with equal concern and respect.”99  
Koggel criticizes, however, the manner in which liberal theory has purported to determine the 
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demands of “equal concern and respect.”  Koggel seeks to temper classical liberal accounts with her 
observations about the intrinsically social nature of categories and their meanings.  In her view, an 
acknowledgment of the role of social power in naming and categorizing people requires that equality 
theorists resist the presumption that there can be any neutral or definitive account of the demands of 
equality:  “Once we let go of the idea that current standards are the only objective and neutral ones 
and…resist the tendency to fall into a two-step process of categorization and judgment, we are in a 
position to take different perspectives as valid points of reference…that can provide valuable 
contributions to our understanding of…what is required to treat people with equal concern and 
respect.”100  Thus, on Koggel’s account, “[t]he basis for moral equality is not any particular quality or 
qualities of a person’s life, but takes shape in the whole network of activity and relationships within 
which people live…. Relationships are so fundamental and primary that we cannot conceive of 
individual interests, projects, and goals having meaning outside of them.”101  For this reason, Koggel 
posits an imperative to account for “the perspectives of those who are in relationships of 
powerlessness, oppression, and inequality as vantage points for understanding particular inequalities 
and for changing the structures that perpetuate unequal relations.”102 
 To this point, Koggel’s work largely parallels the concerns and prescriptions set out by Minow, 
Nedelsky, and other relational theorists.  Koggel parts ways with these theorists, however, as she 
delves deeper into her efforts to bridge the concerns of liberal equality with the demands of relational 
theory.  Koggel’s central project is to bring relational insights to bear on John Rawls’ foundational 
contribution to liberal theory: “the original position.”103  The original position, as set out in Rawls’ 
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Theory of Justice, is a heuristic device designed to aid in achieving fair and just reasoning about 
principles of justice.  In the imagined original position, members of society engage with fundamental 
justice questions, freely and equally, and behind a “veil of ignorance” which precludes knowledge of 
their own specific personal characteristics and social circumstances.  The members know only of 
certain fundamental shared interests, general facts about human psychology, biology, and other 
generally applicable ways of predicting and understanding human preferences and behaviours.  On 
Rawls’ account, persons in the original position would agree first, that “all social primary goods—
liberty, opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally”; 
and second, that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are…to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged…and…attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity.”104 
 Koggel challenges the value of the original position’s claim to impartiality, arguing that 
consideration of social relationships should be foregrounded in equality analysis: “we need people 
with all their encumbrances and in all their embeddedness in social and political contexts engaged in 
critical thinking about different perspectives to know what equality is and requires.”105  Koggel’s 
argument builds on existing feminist critiques of the purported impartiality of the original position.  
In particular, she notes Susan Moller Okin’s trenchant criticism of Rawls’ initial assumption that the 
members of the original position were to be heads of household, representing the interests of the next 
generation; by assuming that family dynamics are not justice problems, Okin posits, important sites 
of gender oppression are omitted from Rawls’ account.  Digging more deeply into Rawls’ 
framework, Okin argues that simply adding gender to the list of features concealed by the veil of 
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ignorance (as Rawls did in his later work106) does not resolve the problem: “When we are forced to 
think about the effects of considering gender in the original position, the result is a more radical 
restructuring of society than Rawls imagines.”107  In particular, Okin points out that empathy is 
required of members of the original position – not mere abstract consideration of impartial 
distributive concerns.  And, Okin posits, such empathy requires understanding of the consequences 
and disadvantages that flow from particular differences.108   
 Koggel elaborates from Okin’s critique a need to account for social relationships in defining 
justice and equality.  On Koggel’s account, real empathic understanding can only emerge through 
actual (not imagined) conversation with real others, in a background of embeddedness in a network 
of relationships: “we can think critically about equality and justice only when we are already 
embedded in social relations of particular sorts…[empathy requires] knowing the factual details of 
inequalities experienced by particular others and knowing the experiential effects of those 
inequalities on particular lives.”109  It is only through learning of the details and experiences of 
“particular disadvantaged lives” that we may “come to feel the injustice of those inequalities.”110  
Rather than illuminate a useful impartial perspective, monological approaches that claim to achieve 
justice through the reflections of a solitary moral reasoner in fact frustrate our understandings of 
inequality by masking biases.111  In Koggel’s view, “[w]hat Rawls actually knows about different 
perspectives is partial, inadequate, and distorted.”112   
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 Instead, Koggel seeks to theorize equality in a way that highlights the relevance of difference.  
In her view, the requirements of the liberal ideal of equal concern and respect can only be achieved 
through an awareness of “the power relations that issue from the human capacities to differentiate 
and evaluate,…how difference looks from the perspective of those identified as different, and… the 
effects on self-concepts and identities and on levels of self-respect of and respect for those grouped 
and defined as different.”113  Koggel’s account thus holds a special place for the perspectives of 
“oppressed groups.”  Koggel believes that “oppressed groups have a particular vantage point that can 
contribute to a greater understanding of how structures maintain and perpetuate oppression.”114  
Koggel explains that “[b]ecause those who are oppressed need to be constantly aware of the 
particularities of the perspective of the dominant and powerful, they are engaged in ever-changing 
adjustments to their strategies of resistance.”115  In Koggel’s view, this creates a particular “vantage 
point” on oppressive structures that can illuminate “the information and the knowledge of 
inequalities perpetuated by those structures.”116  
 Although attention to the perspectives of “oppressed groups” is central to Koggel’s account, 
Koggel offers only a sketch of how we might determine who these groups are.  These oppressed 
groups are important to her theory not only because of their centrality in the account of empathy set 
out above, but also because she relies on this category as a way of limiting her approach from 
requiring unrestrained and unfocused attention to the experiences of each individual person.117  In 
Koggel’s view, the original position should be revised not by seeking to include particular voices of 
each real person, but rather by including discussion among “multiple kinds of people.”118  Among 
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these “kinds of people,” Koggel places a special premium on perceived shared experiences of 
oppressed groups which serve to illuminate oppression: “Attention to commonalities in the 
experiences of those whose differences have mattered to life prospects can explain why all 
perspectives are not equally viable and valuable…. [T]he focus is on inequalities that emerge from 
damaging and oppressive relations, relations that are structured when people are categorized into 
groups and treated as inferior and unequal.”119  Koggel elaborates a further condition on which 
perspectives should be given weight: “Perspectives that themselves create or perpetuate damaging 
and oppressive relationships would…be rejected.  This kind of account can explain why, for 
example, the Ku Klux Klan is not an oppressed group.” 120  
 One has the sense that Koggel thinks her KKK example is an obvious one – that this is 
something of an aside to dispose of an absurd or extreme implication of her approach.  But it reveals 
a problem at the heart of the present inquiry: who are equality laws meant to protect?  While I will 
return to this problem at greater length below, I will pause here to note two serious problems in 
Koggel’s approach to “oppressed groups.”  The first is that, despite her repeated emphasis on 
particularity and context, Koggel seems to suggest that “oppressed groups” share particular insights 
and experience in a way that is relevantly homogeneous within a given oppressed group, and even as 
between various oppressed groups.  The second, and related problem, is that Koggel offers no 
explanation as to how we determine which “kinds of people” warrant inclusion in the community of 
representative standpoints that she seeks to include in her discussions about the requirements of equal 
concern and respect.  We know only that they are “oppressed,” and that they do not themselves 
participate in perpetuating oppressive relationships.  This limiting factor – that these oppressed 
groups cannot themselves be oppressors – gives rise to a third objection.  Her approach seems to 
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invite inquiry into the perceived faults of groups who might otherwise have a claim to special 
attention due to their oppressed status.  Although many would cringe at the proposition that KKK 
members should “count” as persecuted minorities, it is too simple to dispense with this problem on 
the basis that these group members perpetuate oppressive power relationships.  The purportedly 
oppressive gender relationships perpetuated by Muslim communities is frequently relied upon as a 
rationale for limiting protection for Muslim men, and even for Muslim women.121  There is, on the 
other hand, little doubt that Islamophobia is a real phenomenon that produces discriminatory 
treatment and power relationships.122  These examples of competing equality claims resonate with 
other conflicts between religious and sexual minorities, and between the claims of Palestinians and 
Israelis.123  In fact, one would be hard pressed to find a group, oppressed or not, that does not 
participate in some sort of oppressive power relationships.  We will return to the broader problem of 
defining oppressed groups, particularly in the context of legal claims, below.       
Returning now to Koggel’s efforts to reconstruct equality in relational terms:  Koggel builds 
her alternative approach on Carol Gilligan’s “ethic of care,” a theory that forms a strong influence in 
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relational theory.124  Gilligan, a developmental psychologist, has argued that men and women tend 
towards distinct approaches to moral reasoning—and that women’s modes of moral reasoning have 
been inappropriately overlooked and devalued.125  Gilligan’s foundational work, In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, proposes that women conceive of moral problems 
as “aris[ing] from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights,” and as requiring 
resolution through “a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and 
abstract.”126  Gilligan proposes that this feminine “ethics of care” conceives of moral development as 
centered in “the understanding of responsibility and relationships.”127  She contrasts this approach 
with the more masculine conception of an “ethics of justice” that “ties moral development to the 
understanding of rights and rules.”128  Koggel seeks to build an ethical approach that she terms 
“orientation toward other,” building upon the ethics of care identified by Gilligan.  Koggel positions 
her “orientation toward other” as sharing Gilligan’s “core insight about the importance of thinking 
about people in relationships,” while being more attentive to broader social hierarchies, and to the 
experiences of a broader “network of relationships that the marginalized, powerless, and oppressed 
are in.”129  Koggel endorses a “connection between care and oppressed groups” more generally, 
arguing that “[c]are is more appropriately described as an ‘orientation to other,’ a perspective that 
emerges in structures of power when those who are oppressed are forced to situate themselves in 
relation to their oppressors.”130  Thus, on Koggel’s account, the type of moral reasoning set out in 
                                               
124 See, for example, Eva Feder Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), and Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: a Political Argument for an Ethic of Care 
(New York: Routledge, 1993). 
125 See generally Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
126 Ibid at 19. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Koggel, supra note 43 at 153. 
130 Ibid at 157-158. 
30 
 
Gilligan’s ethic of care is not particular to women, but is evident among many “oppressed persons.”  
In Koggel’s view, the “basic insight” of orientation to other is that “those who are oppressed need to 
take account of the dominant and powerful.”131  By attending to the particular perspectives of 
oppressed persons, Koggel believes it is possible to discern and transform the operation of oppressive 
systems.  Thus, “the possibility for enabling and enacting change rests on permitting genuine 
interactions, ones in which the dominant and powerful recognize the validity and value of the 
different perspectives of those who are other oriented.” 132   
 Here again we see shades of the concerns raised above respecting Koggel’s account of 
oppressed groups.  The attribution of a particular perspective or “orientation toward other” risks 
essentializing and homogenizing “oppressed persons” – a group which, however defined, must be 
extremely diverse.  I do not believe, however, that the problems with Koggel’s account of “oppressed 
persons” is fatal to a relational approach to equality.  In fact, I would suggest that Koggel’s efforts to 
attribute particular perspectives to “oppressed persons,” and to assign those perspectives to 
“representatives” for the purposes of a modified original position, runs counter to the relational 
theoretic insights set out by Minow and Nedelsky – and even by Koggel herself in elaborating her 
own relational premises.  Other critics have remarked that, in modifying the original position as she 
does, Koggel loses the only value of the heuristic, “destroys the logic of the original position,” and 
winds up with “a strange and, ultimately, unworkable mix of theoretical elements.”133  I would add 
that by seeking to divide people into groups of “kinds of people” whose viewpoints might be 
properly represented by ambassadors to the original position, Koggel also strays from one of the 
most valuable insights of the relational project she purports to advance: that persons are iteratively 
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generated by relational dynamics, and that categorical thinking risks obscuring important 
particularities of these dynamics.   
The contribution to equality doctrine that I flesh out below takes a tack quite opposite to 
Koggel’s.  Rather than proposing that relevant groupings can be easily (or possibly) discerned for the 
purposes of elaborating the demands of equality, relational insights urge us to consider social context 
in a way that does not depend on determinate groupings or representative standpoints.  Instead, a 
relational approach to equality is best served by seeking ways to account for difference and power 
relationships without recourse to categorical descriptions of social context.  I will return to this 
proposition in Chapter 5.  In the following section, I will address relational approaches to law and 
rights more broadly, before moving on to examine relational approaches to equality doctrine in 
particular.  
Relational Approaches to Law and Rights 
The relational project is undeniably a ‘law’ project—perhaps even an ‘equality law’ project.  
Despite the more sustained theoretical focus on autonomy, relational texts consistently take up 
examples from Canadian and U.S. constitutional equality law to elaborate their frameworks.134  This 
concern with the application of law and rights rather than pure theoretical accounts is consistent with 
Leckey’s observation that “[r]elational theory inscribes itself within feminist political philosophy or 
theory, but it does not content itself with abstract efforts to define its terms.  Instead, it often turns to 
concrete legal issues.”135  Relational theorists often share a wariness of traditional liberal 
constructions of rights as trumps, but seem also to share a desire to rehabilitate rather than discard 
rights as a legal mechanism.  As the following juxtaposition of Minow and Nedelsky will show, 
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however, the approaches to rehabilitating rights—along with the perceived value of doctrinal 
interventions—vary in ways which implicate the usefulness of the present inquiry into U.S. and 
Canadian equality doctrine.       
Minow’s critique of the social construction of categories has serious implications for legal 
analysis, not only because categories are often central to legal reasoning, but also because “[t]he 
names given by law carry real consequences in people’s lives.”136  Minow critiques the role that 
categorical thinking has played in traditional conceptions of rights, juxtaposing her own social 
relations approach against two prior frameworks: the abnormal persons approach, and the rights 
approach.  Together, Minow argues, these approaches have constituted “the roots of the legal 
treatment of difference,” which persist even in contemporary litigation.137 
On Minow’s account, when the explicitly hierarchical, status-driven social logic of feudalism 
gave way to the more formally egalitarian logic of contract and individual autonomy, “two tracks” of 
legal treatment emerged: one track for “normal” people, and one track for those falling in the 
“residual category” which was left unreformed by liberalism.138  Normalcy under this approach was 
defined in accordance with the emerging liberal paradigm of an autonomous, self-determining 
individual.139  For groups who were seen as falling in the residual category of “abnormal persons” 
due to incompetence or dependence—including women, slaves, servants, apprentices, the poor, and 
the mentally deficient—status relationships that had otherwise been formally eliminated persisted.140  
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Those deemed incompetent or abnormal under this model would inhabit “areas that a liberal legal 
order does not reach, areas where an older notion of law continues to operate.”141   
This abnormal persons approach to difference was modified, but not entirely displaced, by a 
“rights approach” expounded by lawyers and theorists during the mid-twentieth century.142  On 
Minow’s account, the rights approach preserves the “either/or” construction of persons as either 
normal or abnormal, but “enables advocates to challenge initial answers” with respect to which 
persons are “really different” and thus warranting different treatment.143  The binary conception of 
difference that characterized the abnormal persons approach persists under this model since a rights 
approach “allows people to move the line between the normal and the abnormal but maintains the 
idea of the distinction and its legal consequences.”144  
For Minow, the persistence of this binary approach to difference limits the “inclusive, 
participatory, and egalitarian” promise of rights.  In Minow’s view, rights analysis “offers release 
from hierarchy and subordination,” but only for “those who can match the picture of the abstract, 
autonomous individual presupposed by the theory of rights.” 145  For those who fail to make the case 
for inclusion in the ‘normal’ group, “rights analysis can be not only unresponsive, but also punitive” 
because it leaves in place those institutions that define and burden difference.146  Rights analysis thus 
allows difference to continue “to represent deviance in the context of existing social arrangements” 
without allowing challenges to the institutional and social forces that define and enforce those 
arrangements and their attendant definitions of normalcy and difference.147  The danger, in Minow’s 
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view, is that reformers who seek inclusion through the language of rights “encounter the dilemma 
that rights crafted for the norm reiterate the differences of those at the margin,” while “special rights 
crafted for those at the margin risk perpetuating the negative effects of difference.”148  The “dilemma 
of difference” (Minow’s term for this problem) is thus perpetuated because the notion of “difference” 
as an objective fact persists: rights analysis “depends on claims to know what counts as a real 
difference” that justifies different treatment.149  The emancipatory potential of rights analysis is thus 
constrained by an assumption that “the status quo is natural and good, except where it has mistakenly 
treated people who are really the same as though they were different.”150 
Nedelsky elaborates a series of related critiques of rights language, some of which flow from 
her concern with the role that boundary has played in dominant conceptions of rights.  Nedelsky 
notes that the history and theory of rights in the liberal tradition is based on an excessive 
individualism that “fails to account for the ways in which our essential humanity is neither possible 
nor comprehensible without the network of relationships of which it is a part…  The selves protected 
by rights are seen as essentially separate and not creatures whose interests, needs, and capacities are 
mutually constitutive.”151  Rights, understood in this way, have the potential to “obscure rather than 
clarify what is at issue, what people are really after.”152  Because the individualist conceptions of 
rights “express and create barriers between people,” they may have a “distancing effect” that works 
to “help us avoid seeing some of the relationships of which we are in fact a part.”153   
Nedelsky goes on to challenge another classic conception of rights that remains powerful: 
“[t]he notion that there are certain basic rights that no government, no matter how democratic, should 
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be able to violate.”154  On this view, Nedelsky explains, “basic rights should be enshrined in the 
constitution, and democratically enacted legislation that violates those rights should be struck down 
by the courts.” 155  Nedelsky’s concern with this conception of “basic rights” is its potential to 
obscure the reality that “debates over the meaning and implementation of rights are inherent in rights 
themselves.”156  Given the contested nature of rights, “The problem of constitutionalism thus can no 
longer simply be protecting rights from democracy.  The more complex problem can be posed in 
various ways, with either rights or collective choice on both sides of the balance.”157 
Despite these criticisms of rights, however, relational theorists have generally sought to 
rehabilitate rather than reject rights language. 158  Often their concerns are pragmatic. Nedelsky, for 
example, explains her decision to focus on rights because “the language of rights has become a 
worldwide phenomenon…. The battle over the use of the term has been decisively won in its 
favour.”159  Given the institutional entrenchment of rights in constitutional law, and the fact that 
people around the world use rights language “to identify serious harms, to make claims against 
governments, to make claims for intervention and assistance,” Nedelsky is of the view that “the best 
thing to do is to engage with the meaning of rights, to shift in a relational direction.”160  Moreover, a 
move to rehabilitate rather than abandon rights is “practical within existing legal systems,” such that 
relational insights might be deployed through rights without requiring “radical restructuring of 
existing laws and courts.”161  For her part, Minow assesses that “[t]here is something too valuable in 
the aspiration of rights, and something too neglectful of the power embedded in assertions of 
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another’s need, to abandon rights.”162  She observes that in practical legal work, “It turns out to be 
helpful, useful, and maybe even essential to be able to couch a request as a claim of right.”163 After 
all, Minow notes, rights rhetoric is “remarkably well suited” to the task of constraining power.164 
Aside from these more strategic considerations, relational theorists have also approved of the 
imperative that rights create for institutions and individuals to “listen” to particular voices and 
experiences.  Koggel asserts that the potential of rights, and equality rights in particular, lies in the 
claim to attention that rights offer: “The discourse of equality and rights …makes it possible for 
marginalized and disadvantaged group members to challenge legislation and policies that violate that 
commitment.”165  Thus the value of rights emerges from the dialogue they produce: “Rights register a 
commitment to moral equality.… They stand as agreements by all members of a community or polity 
that inequality claims will be considered and adjudicated.”166     
On relational accounts, the problems of rights can be cured or alleviated by unmasking rights 
as contingent, debatable social choices, and by rejecting formalism in favour of approaches that focus 
on the actual, lived relationships engaged by rights claims.  Koggel posits that, “a relational approach 
rejects the idea that rights are fixed entities attachable to separate and autonomous individuals.  
Rather, rights emerge in relationships in social contexts and create a forum for dialogue among 
community members.”167  On Nedelsky’s account, the function of rights and law is, inevitably, to 
“structure relations, which, in turn, promote or undermine core values.”168  Nedelsky proposes that 
following such a relational approach, “the focus of analysis will shift from an abstraction of 
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individual entitlement to an inquiry into the ways the right will shape relations and those relations, in 
turn, will promote (or undermine) the values at stake.”169  In Nedelsky’s view this focus will “invite a 
more accurate reflection on the role of the state.”170  Rather than casting rights as given, her relational 
approach proposes that “constitutional protection of rights is best understood as a dialogue of 
democratic accountability.”171  Minow, similarly, casts “rights as tools in continuing, communal 
discourse.”172  Minow posits that, “[i]nterpreting rights as features of relationships, contingent upon 
renegotiations within a community committed to this mode of solving problems, pins law not on 
some force beyond human control but on human responsibility for the patterns of relationships 
promoted or hindered by this process.”173  Thus, by “treating rights rhetoric as a particular 
vocabulary implying roles and relationships within communities and institutions…rights can be 
real—without being fixed; and can change—without losing their legitimacy”174    
Relational Approaches to (and Retreat from) Equality Doctrine 
When it comes to how best to understand and reform legal reasoning, however, a tension 
emerges as to whether reforming legal doctrine is a useful enterprise.  Given the abstract and 
categorical demands of doctrinal formulations, it is arguably not possible or desirable to approach 
doctrine as a site of relational transformation.  As Minow argues, “the very language of legal ‘tests’ 
and ‘levels of scrutiny’ converts significant social choices into mechanical and conclusory 
rhetoric.”175  Nedelsky, Colleen Sheppard, and Nitya Duclos (now Iyer), on the other hand, pursue 
projects that actively explore doctrinal solutions to relational critiques of legal rights analysis.      
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For Minow, a consciousness of the power dynamics expressed through categorization 
requires a preference for particularity and context over abstraction.  In her view, a social relations 
approach “resists solution by category.”176  Minow is conscious of the radical implications of such a 
proposition for legal analysis.  She acknowledges the uncertainty and risk of turning away from 
categorical thinking, and proposes that, if taken seriously, relational thinking may “threaten the very 
idea of law as authoritative and commanding.”177  Nonetheless, Minow is interested in pursuing the 
ways that legal reasoning might be transformed by relational thinking—but not through attention to 
doctrine.  One of the most fully elaborated examples in Minow’s Making all the Difference is a close 
reading of the judicial reasons in Cleburne.  In Cleburne, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of the City of Cleburne’s decision to require, then refuse, a permit to an assisted 
living centre for mentally disabled adults.178  Cleburne was decided under the Equal Protection 
Clause, and the Supreme Court’s judicial reasons dealt squarely with the doctrinal problem that this 
paper will examine more closely below: whether laws targeting a particular group (in this case, 
mentally disabled persons) warrant heightened scrutiny by the courts.  Minow, however, declines to 
engage in these doctrinal debates.  Instead, Minow is interested in exhuming the “clash in world 
views that occurs behind the justices’ arguments over legal doctrine.”179  Closely parsing the three 
sets of reasons proffered by the justices of the United States Supreme Court, Minow points to traces 
of the abnormal persons approach, the rights approach, and the social relations approach, which 
animate the assumptions and values driving the judicial reasoning.  
 Minow’s proposals for transforming legal analysis similarly avoid specific doctrinal 
prescriptions:  
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As a method of legal analysis, the social-relations approach demands analysis of difference in 
terms of the relationships that construct it.  The approach solicits challenges from the 
perspective of those labeled different, and it treats existing institutional arrangements as a 
conceivable source of the problem of difference rather than as an unproblematic background.  
Besides identifying avenues for inquiry about difference, the social relations approach points 
toward a particular, normative evaluation of legal assignments of difference: attributions of 
difference should be sustained only if they do not express or confirm the distribution of 
power in ways that harm the less powerful and benefit the more powerful.180 
 
These directives are general, and do not relate to any particular doctrinal constructions of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Later, Minow elaborates how judicial reasons might embody these insights and 
values, again declining to connect these imperatives to doctrinal questions arising from the equal 
protection context described in this chapter: 
An opinion fully embracing the social-relations approach would not assign difference to a 
group and its members but instead locate difference as a comparison drawn—by somebody—
between groups.  Paying close attention to exactly who names difference, such an analysis 
would consider whether a more powerful group assigns meaning to a trait in order to express 
and consolidate power.  Self-assigned difference, names and identities chosen by the group 
itself, would call for a different analysis.  These identities are not the ones embedded in 
prevailing institutions and assigned to others without their participation.  A judicial opinion 
pursuing the social-relations approach would discuss overtly the relationships between 
people, including the members of the Court and those affected by the Court’s decision.  The 
opinion would avoid the passive voice; its authors would be obliged to disclose their own 
involvement in and responsibility for their assertions.181 
 
Again, Minow might have constructed a doctrinal approach that incorporated these insights, but 
doctrine is not her concern.  In fact, as set out above, she suggests that doctrine more often works to 
distract from, rather than direct attention towards, the kinds of concerns she hopes judges will take up 
in their reasons.  Minow does not go so far as to say that the Court can do without doctrine 
altogether, but she is clearly of the view that, when it comes to legal constructions of equality, 
doctrine is simply not where the action is. 
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 Other scholars, however, have approached doctrine as a productive site of relational inquiry 
and transformation.  Nitya Duclos has advanced a relational framework for assessing a statutory 
human rights regime’s success in accounting for intersectional discrimination.182  Duclos’ study 
explicitly seeks to bring Minow’s insights to bear on the doctrinal construction of statutory 
prohibitions on discrimination: “The most fundamental error in current antidiscrimination doctrine 
lies in its location of difference in the individual complainant rather than in his or her relationship 
with others.  It treats difference as an intrinsic characteristic of the individual—the discrimination is 
due to his or her race or sex—rather than as arising out of the relationship between that individual 
and others.”183  Her prescriptions are similarly aimed at doctrinal reform, urging that “[e]ach ground 
of discrimination listed in the legislation should serve as a ‘jumping off’ point, a springboard 
providing the opportunity to construct an intricate picture of the stereotypes and relationships 
involved.”184  She elaborates that this “intricate picture” ought to be comprised of “three interrelated 
considerations: the characteristics of the people involved (race, gender, and so on), their relationship 
and the conduct arising out of it, and the larger social context within which that relationship is 
located.”185   
Colleen Sheppard similarly seeks to apply relational analysis to assess judicial and doctrinal 
responses to constitutional and statutory treatment of systemic discrimination.  Sheppard’s work 
carefully surveys doctrinal approaches at the constitutional and statutory level, and offers a relational 
framework to enrich current doctrine.  Invoking Minow and Nedelsky, Sheppard argues that “[i]n the 
domain of discrimination…individual experiences (the micro-level) need to be connected to larger 
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societal and group-based realities (the meso and macro-levels)” such that discrimination analyses 
“implicate a socially situated individual and are enhanced by a broad contextual inquiry that 
addresses individual stories, institutional relations, systemic practices, and larger structural and 
societal patterns of inequality and exclusion.”186 
Nedelsky is also expressly concerned with elaborating concrete means of applying relational 
reforms “within existing legal systems,” including through analysis of doctrinal approaches to 
equality.187  To this end, Nedelsky offers a “brief comparison” of Canadian and American equality 
jurisprudence.188  Nedelsky endorses the Supreme Court of Canada’s early equality jurisprudence, 
noting in particular the Andrews formulation that will be discussed more fully below.189  On 
Nedelsky’s assessment, the Canadian equality doctrine set out in Andrews—contrary to American 
equal protection doctrine—requires that claims “must always be assessed in terms of the broad 
context of whether the claimant already stands in relations of inequality, which the challenged law is 
worsening.”190  She approves of the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme Court’s in determining 
sexual orientation to be a ground warranting constitutional equality protection.  In particular, 
Nedelsky notes that the Court’s focus on historical, political, economic and social disadvantage, 
makes this a strong example of effective relational reasoning.191  By contrast, Nedelsky notes the 
American Supreme Court’s focus on intent to discriminate, and lack of attention to whether equality 
claimants in affirmative action cases are members of a disadvantaged group:  
[T]he focus of the [American] jurisprudence is on the use of categories, such as race, and 
whether those categories discriminate against the group bringing the complaint…  The 
jurisprudence does not begin with a question of whether the complainants are members of a 
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disadvantaged group, and it does not focus on the ameliorative or harmful effects of the 
categories.  It does not, therefore, ask the key relational question of whether the challenged 
practice creates a disadvantage through the perpetuation of prejudice or stereotyping.192  
 
In contrasting the Canadian and American approaches, Nedelsky acknowledges that “Canadian 
courts do not always use the textual and jurisprudential openness to a relational approach to a full 
effect,” nor does the American constitution preclude such a relational approach.193  Nonetheless, her 
comparison evinces a view that the doctrinal form of equality inquiries is a productive site for 
elaborating relational approaches to law and equality.  Nedelsky’s analysis here is, by her own 
admission, a brief sketch of Canadian and American approaches to constitutional equality law.194  
The chapters that follow will propose a more sustained inquiry into the relational implications of the 
doctrinal approaches to Canadian grounds of discrimination and U.S. suspect classifications.  
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CHAPTER 2  
EMBRACING AN UNEASY FIT 
 
In the chapters that follow, I will explore the implications of relational theory for a relatively 
narrow set of doctrinal concerns: groups and grounds in Canadian equality law; and suspect classes 
and classifications in U.S. equal protection law.  Three interrelated methodological problems emerge 
from my choice to focus on these puzzles.195  The first of these problems inheres in the potential 
artificiality of hiving off a particular doctrinal question when so many other variables (doctrinal and 
otherwise) affect outcomes and illuminate judicial responses to equality claims.  What use is it to 
introduce a relational framework for discussing the U.S. suspect classification analysis, one might 
ask, when no meaningful transformations will be possible so long as the Court continues its myopic 
focus on discriminatory intent at the expense of attention to actual impact on affected groups?196  Or, 
it might be argued, there is no value in analyzing the U.S. Court’s approach to suspect classification 
without addressing the inconsistent manner in which the Court seems to apply the ‘levels of scrutiny’ 
that supposedly attend these classifications.197  In the Canadian context, similar arguments might 
arise about the propriety of considering the grounds inquiry in relative isolation.  Since Canada has a 
relatively expansive list of protected grounds, might our energies not be better spent interrogating the 
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Court’s recent narrowing of the definition of discrimination?198  Or perhaps an analysis of Canadian 
constitutional equality law is not complete unless it addresses the apparent increase in focus on intent 
over impact—departing from the Court’s promise to reject the American intent-based 
jurisprudence?199  In either jurisdiction, it might be further argued, “equality law” is not the best 
means of addressing equality concerns.  Inequality, some suggest, may be better addressed through 
constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights or due process, or through less legalistic political 
channels.200   
The second concern is disclosed in my discussion of the first: is it not misleading to discuss 
the Canadian analogous grounds inquiry alongside the American suspect classification inquiry when 
there is so much that differs between these two national constitutional contexts?  The U.S. Equal 
Protection Clause was adopted nearly 150 years ago, at a time when an entrenched and brutal system 
of racialized slavery was “almost too recent to be called history.”201  The Canadian Constitutional 
equality provision has not yet celebrated its thirtieth anniversary as enforceable law, and was drafted 
and revised through a process of broad consultation with community groups, impact assessments, and 
months of public hearings.202  As will be elaborated below, many features of Canada’s constitutional 
equality provision were drafted in direct contrast to developments in American equal protection 
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jurisprudence.  Moreover the United States Supreme Court has purported to interpret its briefly 
phrased guarantee of “equal protection of the laws” to focus on intentional discrimination and 
irrational government distinctions.203  The Canadian Supreme Court, on the other hand, has 
interpreted its lengthy equality guarantee—complete with an express allowance for ameliorative 
programs and an open-ended list of nine expressly protected grounds—with a stated focus on 
“substantive equality.”204  This list of differences in constitutional context would still be woefully 
incomplete even if we were to add the radically different approaches to federalism, to administrative 
law, and to statutory human and civil rights regimes that have informed the development and impact 
of constitutional equality laws in these two countries—not to mention those more ephemeral 
concerns that might be described as “constitutional culture.”205 
A third and final concern arises from the choice to focus on constitutional doctrine at all.  
Recall Minow’s caution, set out in the previous chapter, that “the very language of legal ‘tests’ and 
‘levels of scrutiny’ converts significant social choices into mechanical and conclusory rhetoric.”206  I 
do not pretend to have a true “answer” to these concerns – only an explanation of why I proceed with 
this project despite their validity. 
First, I acknowledge the limitations of focusing on a particular doctrinal question.  Jed 
Rubenfeld observes that, “[u]nsurprisingly, given lawyers’ basic training in doctrinal sorting, the 
relationships among different doctrines are systematically underappreciated in the legal literature.”207  
At the risk of contributing to this problem, I seek in this paper to bridge relational insights to a 
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207 Jed Rubenfeld, “The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda” (2002) 111 Yale LJ 1141 at 1144. 
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particular set of doctrinal debates in their current form.  There are, without a doubt, other 
conversations into which relational theory might be productively deployed—or other nascent 
conversations waiting to be started by the introduction of a relational perspectives to various 
doctrinal or legal debates.  My focus here is on the parallel discussions taking place in the Canadian 
and American courts about their respective doctrinal approaches to the role that social groups and 
grounds of discrimination should play in equality analysis.  I propose that in the context of such a 
discourse analysis (rather than an effort to advance a predictive or explanatory hypothesis) it is 
appropriate in this project to take these debates as I find them. 
Second, I recognize that there are serious and meaningful differences between Canadian and 
American equality analyses that give rise to a risk of oversimplification or false analogy in 
juxtaposing the U.S. suspect classification doctrine with the Canadian analogous grounds approach.  
I offer more detail on these differences and their significance to this project at the beginning of 
Chapter 5.  My answer to this concern is that the emergence of the groups/grounds and 
class/classification distinctions in framing two such different approaches to equality is part of what 
interests me here.  I endeavour throughout to avoid false or misleading comparisons of the doctrinal 
debates in the two countries, and make every effort to elaborate important differences where I see 
them.  Ultimately, risk of false analogy and failure to appreciate differences in context are necessary 
hazards of comparative study.   
 Third, I believe that there is much to what Minow says about doctrinal analysis masking or 
deflecting attention from deeper debates about underlying social choices.  I also believe, however, 
that these debates exist not just “behind” doctrinal debates as Minow suggests, but also within 
them.  I am interested here in exploring doctrine as its own site of meaning-making and expression of 
values deserving of our attention.  This is particularly so since doctrine not only communicates and 
manifests our assumptions, but also takes the form of explicit directives.  Alongside the many factors 
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that give law its shape and meaning, doctrine persists as part of the language and form of legal 
reasoning.  The present inquiry is not doctrinal in the conventional sense of seeking to discern the 
true or proper form of legal reasoning; it is an examination of the way the law talks about justice.  
All of these reasons speak to an interest in elaborating viable approaches to equality law.  But 
I come to this project with another interest as well—one which supports this paper’s attention to a 
relatively narrow doctrinal problem.  That other interest is in elaborating viable approaches to 
relational theory.  Many of the works expounding the relational dimensions of equality operate in 
broad strokes, focusing on general approaches to defining equality,208 understanding relational 
approaches to difference and diversity,209 or exploring the many complex puzzles that relational 
habits of mind provoke across a range of political, social, and legal contexts.210  Perhaps because of a 
desire to complicate the very sort of categorical and mechanical reasoning that often dominates 
doctrinal debate, relational theorists have often chosen to engage in projects that do not require 
sustained doctrinal study.  There are exceptions, of course.  Duclos has considered the implications 
of relational theory for intersectional discrimination claims under Canadian statutory human rights 
law;211 Sheppard has studied the relational dimensions of substantive equality analysis in the context 
of Canadian legal responses to systemic discrimination;212  Leckey has considered relational theory, 
and his own related “contextual” approach as applied to family law and administrative law.213  The 
present project proceeds in tandem with these efforts.   
                                               
208 See, for example Koggel, supra note 43. 
209 See for example Minow, supra note 22. 
210 See, for example, Nedelsky, supra note 29. 
211 Duclos, supra note 182. 
212 Sheppard, supra note 186. 
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I believe that relational theory offers important insights into how we might better 
conceptualize persistent debates arising from competing social and legal approaches to equality.  
Many of these debates, however, take place in the language of doctrine, and in the forum of legal 
argument and decision.  A key challenge for relational theory, if it is to make itself relevant to these 
debates, is to translate its insights into these languages.  Of course, there is always a risk that 
important meanings will be lost or distorted in translation—a problem that arguably accounts for the 
shortcomings in Koggel’s efforts to bridge relational and liberal theory.  But part of the process of 
building relational habits of mind must include engagement with the languages that law speaks now.     
I believe that the puzzles surrounding the meanings expressed through doctrinal approaches 
to grounds of discrimination and suspect classifications generate a productive starting point for such 
an engagement.  This particular doctrinal problem has something of a Rosetta stone quality—
inscribed with relational and doctrinal meanings at once, though perhaps without a clear key for 
deciphering how they might interact.  The doctrinal formulations seem to spill inevitably, if 
awkwardly, into decidedly relational territory when they ask which groups or grounds matter, and 
why.  Considering this particular connection between relational and doctrinal approaches to equality, 
it is my hope here to begin a conversation about the ways that relational framings might productively 
shift the terms of doctrinal debate. 
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CHAPTER 3  
CLASSES AND CLASSIFICATIONS IN U.S. EQUAL PROTECTION LAW 
 
 The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
Slaughter-house Cases.  The majority decision in the Slaughter-house Cases emphasized the recent 
historical context of American racialized slavery, and the persistence of legalized oppression of 
African Americans, as the core concerns of the Amendment.  The decision considered the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—collectively known as the “Reconstruction Amendments” 
or the “Civil War Amendments” —concluding that “The most cursory glance at these articles 
discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times, which cannot 
fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true meaning. Nor can 
such doubts, when any reasonably exist, be safely and rationally solved without a reference to that 
history.”214  For the justices, this attention did not require parsing contested accounts of the causes of 
war,215 or minute analysis of the final language of the amendments,216 since “that history is fresh 
within the memory of us all, and its leading features, as they bear upon the matter before us, free 
from doubt.”217 
                                               
214 Slaughter-house Cases, supra note 201 at 67. 
215 Ibid at 68: “whatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to bring about this war, undoubtedly the 
overshadowing and efficient cause was African slavery.” 
216 Ibid at 69, regarding the Twelfth Amendment (U.S. Const. amend. XII): “To withdraw the mind from the 
contemplation of this grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race within the 
jurisdiction of this government—a declaration designed to establish the freedom of four millions of slaves—
and with a microscopic search endeavor to find in it a reference to servitudes which may have been attached to 
property in certain localities requires an effort, to say the least of it.” 
217 Ibid at 68. 
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Ninety years after the declaration of independence was signed in 1776, and following many 
more years of slavery during the colonial period, the first Reconstruction Amendment (the Thirteenth 
Amendment) abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime.218  The 
Court viewed the “obvious purpose” of this “grand yet simple” amendment as being tied to the 
particular context of racialized slavery in America. 219  The Thirteenth Amendment was to “establish 
the freedom of four millions of slaves” and “to forbid all shades and conditions of African 
slavery.”220  The Slaughter-house Cases cast the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments as being tied to the same historical imperative as the Thirteenth.  The Justice recalled 
that these amendments were promulgated in the wake of efforts by the former Confederate states to 
place “laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens and curtailed their 
rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little 
value.”221  Laws forbade former slaves from appearing in towns “in any other character than menial 
servants,” from purchasing or owning land, from participating in specified occupations, from 
testifying in courts “in any case where a white man was a party,” and from voting.222  This state of 
formal law, in combination with lack of enforcement of those laws which might have protected 
former slaves,223 led the drafters of the reconstruction amendments to conclude that, “something 
more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered 
                                               
218 U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction.” 
219 Slaughter-house Cases, supra note 201 at 69. 
220 Ibid at 69. 
221 Ibid at 70. 
222 Ibid at 70 and 71.   
223 Ibid at 70. 
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so much.”224  On the Court’s account, these further protections were thus enacted with this particular 
“unfortunate race” in mind.225  
 The Reconstruction Amendments included a range of protections, including the “Equal 
Protection Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the focus of the present inquiry.  The 
Equal Protection Clause guarantees that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall…deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”226  Other Fourteenth 
Amendment protections include the Citizenship Clause, which provided that “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside”;227 and the Due Process Clause, which provided that state 
governments shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”228  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress the power to pass laws enforcing 
the Amendment’s provisions.  The Fifteenth Amendment concluded the trilogy of Reconstruction 
Amendments, declaring that “the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”229  The Fifteenth 
Amendment thus evinces a direct textual connection with the historical context of racialized slavery.  
The Court concluded further that “it is just as true that each of the other [reconstruction] articles was 
addressed to the grievances of that [negro] race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.”230  
                                               
224 Ibid at 70. 
225 Ibid at 71. 
226 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid.  The Due Process Clause replicates protections against intrusions by the federal government set out in 
the Fifth Amendment of the original Bill of Rights.  The dense interpretive history of this clause, including 
guarantees of substantive and procedural due process, are beyond the scope of this paper.  
229 U.S. Const. amend. XV.  Women would not be granted voting rights until 1920, with the passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment.  U.S. Const. amend. XIX. For an early Supreme Court case upholding the restriction 
of the vote to men as permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Minor v Happersett, 88 US 162 
(1875).  
230 Slaughter-house Cases, supra note 201 at 71. 
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The Reconstruction Amendments, including the Equal Protection Clause, were thus seen to be united 
by “one pervading purpose”: “the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of 
that freedom, and the protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those 
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”231   
 But the Equal Protection Clause was of secondary importance in the Slaughter-house Cases, 
which were decided primarily on the basis of a now-defunct interpretation of the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.232  Beyond the obiter dicta affirming the historical 
and political purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment set out by the Slaughter-house Cases majority, 
the early years of judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment have generally been cast as 
embodying a period of retrenchment from the aspirations of the Reconstruction Amendments.  
Robert Cover explains that the Slaughter-house Cases majority’s approach to “Negroes as a special 
object of protection” was short-lived, and argues that there was a “massive retreat from protecting 
Black rights between the 1870’s and the 1920’s—a retreat led by the Court in many instances.”233  
Frank J. Scaturro refers to this period as the “Retreat from Reconstruction,”234 and William Wiecek 
described the Courts’ early years of interpretation as having “fabricated a structure of law that gutted 
the substance of the Civil War Amendments as far as the freedpeople were concerned.”235  Tussman 
and tenBroek assessed that the Equal Protection Clause was “[v]irtually strangled in infancy by post-
                                               
231 Ibid. 
232 Akhil Amar explains that “[v]irtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that 
Slaughter-House is a plausible reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Akhil R Amar, “Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine” (2000) 114 Harv L Rev 26 at 123, fn 327. 
233 Robert M. Cover, “The Origins of Judicial Activisim in the Protection of Minorities” (1982) 91:7 Yale LJ 
1287 at 1295. 
234 Frank J. Scaturro, The Supreme Court’s Retreat from Reconstruction: A Distortion of Constitutional 
Jurisprudence (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000) at 1-158. 
235 William M. Wiececk, “Synoptic of United States Supreme Court Decisions Respecting the Rights of 
African-Americans, 1873-1940” (2003) 4 Barry L Rev 21 at 21. 
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civil-war judicial reactionism.”236  Reva Siegel describes early judicial approaches to the Fourteenth 
Amendment as an instance of “preservation-through-transformation,” through which institutions that 
legally subordinated African Americans were substantively maintained, despite rhetorical 
transformations following legal emancipation and the enactment of the Reconstruction 
Amendments.237   
From the early equal protection cases through the Lochner era, the Equal Protection Clause 
was treated as a pure rationality test, often relied upon to strike economic regulation.238  The 
provision was deployed in some instances to protect African Americans against more egregious 
intrusions upon their civil and political rights (for example, in cases relating to exclusions of African 
Americans as jurors), but was famously held to allow segregation in the 1896 Plessy v Ferguson 
decision—a precedent which would bind the Court into the 1950s.239  Michael Klarman describes the 
early equal protection cases as “reveal[ing] a court intuiting that racial classifications were different 
from others, yet unable to articulate or fully comprehend why.”240  
In 1938, the Supreme Court issued a decision that would come to re-awaken and transform 
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—and begin to answer Klarman’s pending question about 
why racial discrimination might differ from other kinds of distinctions.  In Carolene Products, the 
Court considered a due process challenge to a law which prohibited the interstate shipment of “filled 
milk” (a blend of dairy milk with non-dairy fat or oil). This was not an equal protection case, and the 
issues raised bore no apparent relation to the social justice problems associated with modern equal 
                                               
236 Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, “The Equal Protection of the Laws” (1949) 37 Calif L Rev 341 at 
381. 
237 Reva B. Siegel, “Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State 
Action” (1997) 49 Stan L Rev 1111 at 1119. 
238 Michael Klarman, “An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection” (1991) 90:2 Mich L Rev 213 at 
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protection law.  But the Court’s reasons laid the groundwork for the suspect class doctrine that would 
come to play a pivotal role in modern equal protection jurisprudence.  The Carolene Products Court 
upheld the restriction on shipments of filled milk on the basis that such a legislative judgment should 
be found valid “unless, in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a 
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge 
and experience of the legislators.”241  This broad grant of legislative discretion, however, was 
qualified by a now famous footnote—a footnote that, Jack Balkin explains, has become “more 
important than the text.”242  Footnote Four suggested that the rational basis standard upon which the 
instant case was decided may not apply in all cases; instead, the footnote reflected tentatively,243 that, 
“[t]here may be narrower scope for the operation of the presumption of constitutionality” in certain 
cases, such as those engaging the fundamental rights set out in the first ten amendments.244  The 
footnote went on even more cautiously, asserting that it was “unnecessary to consider” two other 
circumstances which might warrant special constitutional scrutiny: those which engage restrictions 
on the political process, and those which engage the rights of certain minorities.245  These two 
concerns were linked, with the protection of minorities being supported by a political-process 
rationale: 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed 
at particular religious…or racial minorities….: whether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry….246 
 
                                               
241 United States v Carolene Products Company, 304 US 144 at 152 (1938) [Carolene Products]. 
242 Jack M Balkin, “The Footnote” (1989) 83 Nw U L Rev 275 at 281. 
243 For a discussion of the tentative tone of Footnote Four, see Balkin, ibid at 284. 
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This footnote gave rise to a new era of Constitutional interpretation, under which laws which engage 
certain kinds of rights, or target certain kinds of populations, would warrant heightened judicial 
scrutiny.247  
 The process by which class-based scrutiny fitfully migrated from a footnote of obiter dicta in 
a due process decision to a controlling doctrinal rule in equal protection law is subject to debate.  
Many trace the adoption of the Carolene Products rationale into equal protection analysis to the 
Korematsu decision in which the Supreme Court upheld the internment of Japanese Americans 
during the Second World War.248  After a brief recitation of the facts, the majority in Korematsu 
posited: 
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are 
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing 
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism 
never can.   
 
Michael Klarman, however, contests the “received wisdom” that Korematsu ushered in a doctrinal 
commitment to heightened scrutiny for suspect classes, even in cases of racial discrimination.249  He 
cites Korematsu and Hirabayashi (a case in which the Court upheld curfew rules targeting Japanese 
Americans) as being the first instances where the Supreme Court did “discourse generally upon the 
evils of racial discrimination.”250  In Klarman’s view, however, these cases were in fact decided on 
                                               
247 Kenji Yoshino explains that this case is “viewed by many as the fountainhead of the heightened scrutiny 
framework for minority groups.” Yoshino supra note 4 at 758, citing Gerald Gunther, Cases and Materials on 
Constitutional Law, 10th ed (New York: Foundation Press, 1980) at 542; Milner S Ball, “Judicial Protection of 
Powerless Minorities” (1974) 59 Iowa L Rev 1059; and Cover, supra note 233.  See also Leslie Griedman 
Goldstein, “Between the Tiers: The New[est] Equal Protection and Bush v. Gore” (2002) 4:2 U Pa J Const L 
372 at 372-373. 
248 Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944) [Korematsu].  Klarman refers to this interpretation as 
“received wisdom.”  Klarman, supra note 238 at 227.  See also Goldstein, supra note 247. 
249 Klarman, supra note 238 at 227. 
250 Ibid at 232, citing Korematsu, supra note 248 and Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81 (1943).  
Klarman notes Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US 303 (1880) as an early exception. 
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the same rational basis review that had historically governed equal protection cases.  On Klarman’s 
account, the Carolene Products call for heightened scrutiny was quickly adopted by the Court in “a 
wide array of contexts,” but was not taken up with any real interpretive weight with respect to racial 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, until the mid-1960s.251  He notes that even the 
famous 1954 Brown decision did not state a racial classification rule.252 
 Regardless of the precise shifts in rhetoric and doctrine during this period, however, there is 
no doubt that by the 1970’s, tiered scrutiny on the basis of variably suspect classifications had 
become the law of the land. 253  The 1970’s were marked by a cluster of newly-recognized “suspect 
classifications,” the targeting of which would give rise to special judicial scrutiny.254  By 1977, the 
Court had established three distinct “tiers” of classifications, with attendant levels of judicial 
scrutiny.255  Unless a petitioner could show that an impugned distinction discriminated against a 
“suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class, or engaged a fundamental right, the Court would subject 
legislation to the lowest standard of “rational basis review,” requiring only that the classification be 
“rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest.”256  Distinctions on the basis of wealth, age 
and disability were all held to be non-suspect, warranting this lowest level of scrutiny.257  The most 
rigorously scrutinized of all classifications, those which discriminated on the basis of a “suspect 
classification,” would only be upheld in cases where the state is able to satisfy the Court that the 
classification had been “drawn with ‘precision’… ‘tailored’ to serve their legitimate objectives… 
                                               
251 Klarman, supra note 238 at 220. 
252 Ibid at 247.  Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954). 
253 See generally Goldberg, supra note 197. 
254 Suzanne Goldberg links the advocacy for recognition of new suspect classifications in this period to the 
“fertile period of social change in the 1960’s and 1970’s.”  Ibid at 498-499. 
255 Craig v Boren, 429 US 190 (1976) [Craig]. 
256 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307 at 312 (1976) [Murgia]. 
257 Ibid; Cleburne, supra note 178; and San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973) [Rodriguez]. 
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[and is] the ‘less drastic means.’”258  This highest degree of scrutiny was reserved for cases involving 
classifications on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and (in certain cases) alienage.259  
Between these extremes, the Court determined that classifications on the basis of gender and 
illegitimacy are “quasi-suspect,” engaging an intermediate level of scrutiny which requires the law to 
be “substantially related” to “important” or “significant” government objectives.260  These 
classifications, and the attendant level of scrutiny assigned to them in the 1970’s, continue to control 
equal protection analysis today. 
The level of scrutiny assigned by the Courts to an impugned distinction is more than a 
formality in U.S. equal protection legislation.  Although the Court has occasionally been accused of 
sporadically and covertly deploying “rational basis with bite,”261 or otherwise applying a level of 
scrutiny more or less demanding than it declares,262 commentators have generally concluded that the 
assigned levels of scrutiny are strongly associated with outcomes.  Kenji Yoshino explains that “[t]he 
words “scrutiny” and “review” suggest an examination rather than a result. Yet in this jurisprudence, 
looks can kill.”263  Gerald Gunther has similarly referred to strict scrutiny as “fatal in fact,”264 and Jed 
                                               
258 Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330 at 343 (1972). 
259 For a summary of the restrictions on the scope of suspect classification in cases where discrimination is 
alleged on the basis of alienage, see Yoshino, supra note 4 at 176, fn 65. 
260 Metro Broadcasting, Inc v FCC, 497 US 547 at 564-565 (1990); Craig, supra note 255; and Trimble v 
Gordon, 430 US 762 (1977) [Trimble]. 
261 See for example Gayle Lynn Pettinga, “Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other 
Name” (1987) 62 Ind LJ 779. 
262 See for example Jeremy B Smith, “Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation” 
(2005) 73 Fordham L Rev 2769. 
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Equal Protection” (1972) 86:1 Harv L Rev 1 at 8.  The Court has denied this characterization:  Adarand 
Constructors, Inc v Peña, 515 US 200 at 237 (1995) [Adarand]. 
58 
 
Rubenfeld has said that “strict equal protection scrutiny is almost always fatal.”265  Laurence Tribe 
has called this higher standard of review a “virtual death blow” to challenged state action.266   
Yet despite the controlling force of the level of scrutiny applied, the assignment of various 
classifications to the three tiers of scrutiny appears to have been piecemeal and unprincipled.267  
Thomas Simon, has referred to the current approach as “an analytical muddle.”268  Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson summarizes that, while historical discrimination, political powerlessness, and the 
presence of immutable and visible characteristics are often discussed in these cases, the Courts “have 
often disregarded some or all of them in their analysis.”269  Marcy Strauss’ recent review of suspect 
classification case law similarly reveals that courts emphasize certain factors over others “without 
any real explanation,”270 and that “[e]ven the most commonly utilized factors have no clearly 
established meaning.”271  The following brief survey of the Court’s reasons in accepting and rejecting 
various proposed classifications reveals this lack of consistent or coherent jurisprudence.   
                                               
265 Rubenfeld, supra note 15 at 433. 
266 Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) 1st ed (New York: Foundation Press) at 16-30.  See 
also Robert C. Farrell’s quantitative analysis of rational basis claims between 1971 and 1996, finding that the 
Court upheld over 100 classifications under rational basis scrutiny, while striking fewer than a dozen on this 
standard.  Robert C Varrell, “Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term 
through Romer v. Evans” (1999) 32 Ind L Rev 357. 
267 Thomas Simon has called the Court’s approach to defining heightened scrutiny as “haphazard.”  Thomas 
Simon, “Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory” (1990) 45 U Miami L Rev 107 at 141.  Similar 
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268 Simon, supra note 267 at 141. 
269 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race: The Inversion of Privilege and 
Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence” (2003) 3 U Ill L Rev 615 at 636.  
270 Marcy Strauss, “Reevaluating Suspect Classifications” (2011) 35 Seattle U L Rev 135 at 138.  
271 Ibid at 139.  Strauss concludes that “[t]he Supreme Court has not provided a coherent explanation for 
precisely what factors trigger heightened scrutiny.”  Ibid at 138. 
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Race and alienage were both granted suspect status, essentially without explanation.272  
Suzanne Goldberg has suggested that “widespread awareness that the equal protection guarantee 
condemned race discrimination…rendered unnecessary the creation of a test to explicate or justify 
the Court’s suspicion of racial classifications.”273  As noted above, the extent to which the Korematsu 
case affirmed heightened scrutiny on the basis of race is debatable; in fact, the reasons disclose both 
references to strict scrutiny for race cases, and the clear application of a rational basis review in the 
instant case.274  In any event, the Court did not explain why racial distinctions in general, or racial 
distinctions targeting the Japanese petitioners, might be suspect.275  The Court’s later pronouncement 
in McLaughlin that the “widest discretion” normally allowed to legislative judgment is to be 
supplanted by “most rigid scrutiny” in cases of racial classification,276 noted the importance of “the 
historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial 
discrimination emanating from official sources in the States,” and emphasized that racial distinctions 
are generally irrelevant to “any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.”277  Subsequently, in 
Graham, the Court concluded that distinctions based on alienage were “like those based on 
                                               
272 Korematsu, supra note 248; and Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365 (1971) [Graham].  Marcy Strauss has 
also noted the lack of justification offered for these classifications.  Strauss, supra note 270 at 144-145.  
273 Goldberg, supra note 197 at 498, fn66. 
274 Compare the Court’s description of the law in Korematsu, supra note 248 at 216 (“all legal restrictions 
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curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing 
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”  
Korematsu, supra note 248 at 216.  
276 McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184 at 192 (1964) [McLaughlin].   
277 Ibid at 192 and 198.  
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nationality or race,” and were therefore “inherently suspect.”278  The Court posited without further 
explanation that “Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” as 
described in Carolene Products. 279 
 In 1973, in Frontiero, the Court struck down a law which required that uniformed 
servicewomen prove their husbands’ actual financial dependence in order to claim them as 
dependents, while male servicemen were entitled to claim their wives as dependents regardless of 
those couples’ actual financial circumstances.280  In so holding, a plurality of the Court concluded 
that such gender-based distinctions should be held to strict scrutiny.281  (A majority of the Court 
would later conclude in Craig that gender distinctions should receive intermediate scrutiny.282)  
Justice Brennan’s plurality reasons elaborated a variety of factors which have continued to hold sway 
in equal protection analysis.  First and foremost, he emphasized that the United States “has had a 
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”283  He analyzed the Court’s own discursive 
stance towards women, citing a then-100-year-old decision in which the Court reflected that “The 
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many 
of the occupations of civil life.” 284  He concluded that a pervasive “romantic paternalism” resulted in 
women being put “not on a pedestal, but in a cage,” such that “our statute books gradually became 
laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes.”285  This reflection on the 
interrelationship between social attitudes and legal oppression was followed by a direct analogy to 
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the social and legal context of slavery: “throughout much of the 19th century, the position of women 
in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave 
codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, 
and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to 
serve as legal guardians of their own children.”286  The bulk of the reasons, and the substance of the 
analogy on which the Court relied, was thus focused on “the position of women in our society,” as 
manifest in legal rules.  Shorter shrift was given to other factors such as “the high visibility of the sex 
characteristic” (cited briefly for its contribution to ongoing limitations on women’s opportunities);287 
evidence of congressional efforts to protect women against discrimination;288 the proposition that 
“sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident 
of birth;”289 and Justice Brennan’s assessment that, unlike intelligence or physical disability, “the sex 
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”290   
While Justice Brennan acknowledged that women’s social circumstances have improved, he 
observed that “women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle discrimination in our 
educational institutions, in the job market and perhaps most conspicuously in the political arena.”291  
To this point, Brennan appended a footnote reflecting on the application of the Carolene Products 
political process rationale in light of the fact that “when viewed in the abstract, women do not 
constitute a small and powerless minority.”292  Brennan, however, rejected this analysis “in the 
abstract,” focusing instead on the fact of women’s political underrepresentation: “There has never 
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been a female President, nor a female member of this Court. Not a single woman presently sits in the 
United States Senate, and only 14 women hold seats in the House of Representatives. And…this 
underrepresentation is present throughout all levels of our State and Federal Government.” 293 
Also in 1973, the Supreme Court upheld a property-tax-based public school funding scheme 
that resulted in substantially lower quality of education for students living in property-poor 
districts.294  Justice Powell’s majority reasons in Rodriguez reveal a preoccupation with the ease of 
defining membership in the proposed suspect class, at the expense of attention to the relational 
dimensions of the claim that had been emphasized in the Court’s discussion of women in Frontiero.  
Justice Powell remarks that the petitioners’ case lacked a “definitive description of the classifying 
facts or delineation of the disfavored class,”295 suggesting that this left the Court with “serious 
unanswered questions” about “whether a class of this size and diversity could ever claim the special 
protection accorded ‘suspect’ classes.”296  Justice Powell spends several pages of his reasons parsing 
the difficulties in defining with precision the circumstances of such possible suspect classes as 
“‘poor’ persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who might be 
characterized as functionally indigent”; “those who are relatively poorer than others”; or “those who, 
irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts.”297  He 
rejects the proposition that heightened scrutiny should be afforded to “a large, diverse, and 
amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less 
taxable wealth than other districts,”298 then offers a perfunctory and conclusory assessment that “[t]he 
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system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of 
suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”299  
 The Court’s concentration on group definition in Rodriguez worked to crowd out 
consideration of the actual social circumstances of the claimants—children in underfunded school 
districts.  Moreover, Justice Powell’s exacting scrutiny of who exactly “counts” in a suspect class—
and the ease of drawing a precise border around who is “in” and who is “out” —betrays an 
underlying assumption that some social groupings do reflect precise and naturalized boundaries 
between groups of people.  It assumes, moreover, that the differences which are the most “obvious” 
or easily discernable from the vantage point of the judiciary are the differences that matter most for 
the purposes of equal protection analysis.  This assumption runs counter to Bruce Ackerman’s 
famous observation that it is “anonymous and diffuse” groups, rather than “discrete and insular” 
groups (in the sense of being obvious and visible), who are “systematically disadvantaged in a 
pluralist democracy.”300  Moreover, even race, presumptively demarcating the paradigmatic “discrete 
and insular minority,” does not create the kind of clean lines that Justice Powell seems to require 
here: it is often forgotten that, in the case that enshrined America’s most notorious judicial approval 
of racial segregation, Mr. Plessy’s first line of argument was that he was wrongly sent to the 
“colored” carriage—not because racial segregation was wrong, but because Mr. Plessy should have 
been considered white.301     
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In the Court’s 1976 decision in Murgia, the Court upheld a rule requiring uniformed police 
officers to retire at age 50 regardless of fitness for duty.302  In that case, the Court was unconcerned 
with visibility or immutability, and focused their (again perfunctory) analysis on historical and 
political marginalization, and the generalized relevance of “age” as a characteristic.  The Court held 
that, “[w]hile the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, 
such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national 
origin, have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment.’”303  The Court emphasized 
that, in their view, “the aged” had not “been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of 
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”304  This comment was somewhat 
ironic in the case of an individual officer who was being relieved of duties on the basis of 
assumptions about the abilities of older workers which all parties agreed were untrue of the 
petitioner.305  The Court posited without further analysis that “old age does not define a ‘discrete and 
insular’ group…in need of ‘extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’  
Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span.”306 
 In the 1977 Trimble decision, the Supreme Court struck down an Illinois law which 
prevented “illegitimate” children from inheriting from intestate fathers, although “legitimate” 
children were permitted to do so.307  The Court determined that laws which discriminate on the basis 
of legitimacy should be subject to intermediate scrutiny—neither warranting “our most exacting 
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scrutiny,” nor “toothless” rational basis review.308  In support of this decision, the Court endorsed the 
reasons in an earlier case, Mathews, in which the Court had reflected that “illegitimacy is analogous 
in many respects to the personal characteristics that have been held to be suspect.”309  In Mathews, 
the Court found that the analogy to race or national origin held insofar as illegitimacy was “a 
characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears 
no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society.”310  The Court’s 
decision not to grant the highest level of scrutiny, however, was controlled by an inquiry into the 
extent of historical discrimination, and their conclusion that “this discrimination against illegitimates 
has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination 
against women and Negroes.”311 
 And with that, the Court shut the doors on suspect classification.  Despite much clamouring 
at the gates,312 the Court has not granted heightened scrutiny to distinctions targeting any new group 
or classification since the 1977 Trimble decision.  As Professor Yoshino explains, “with respect to 
federal equal protection jurisprudence, the canon has closed.”313  Efforts to achieve heightened 
scrutiny for such diverse classifications as sexual orientation and mental disability have either failed 
outright, or been evaded by a Court eager to decide cases without delving into the thorny question of 
suspect classification.314  In the 1985 Cleburne decision, the majority of the Court practically 
announced this shift in declining to extend heightened scrutiny to “mentally retarded” persons: 
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[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect …it 
would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have 
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate 
the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least 
part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the 
mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do 
so.315  
 
Suzanne Goldberg has suggested that, given the strong correlation between the ostensible indicia of 
suspectness, and the refusal of protection in cases like Cleburne, the Court has proceeded with a 
“first in time is first in right” approach:  “it appears that a central reason for heightened scrutiny’s 
restriction to five traits is temporal, in that those traits received the Court’s protection before slippery 
slope-type fears about the potential reach of rigorous review set in.”316  In any event, the DOMA 
decision referenced at the beginning of this paper is just the most recent example of the Court’s 
continued reluctance to seriously consider extending heightened scrutiny to new classes.   
Notably, the evolution of tiered scrutiny was punctuated throughout by vigorous opposition 
from dissenting Justices opposed to the Court’s emerging approach.  Justice Stevens famously 
rejected tiered scrutiny altogether, asserting that, “there is only one Equal Protection Clause,” and 
calling on the Court to adopt a single standard of review.317  He called for a universal standard of 
rationality, while “[l]oosening the phrase ‘rational basis’ from its diluted, technical use.”318  Justice 
Stevens cautioned that groups suffering a “tradition of disfavour” are likely to be subject to 
classification on the basis of “[h]abit rather than analysis” such that the classification has “no rational 
relationship – other than pure prejudicial discrimination – to the stated purpose for which the 
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classification is being made.”319  Justice Stevens thus anchored his brand of universally-applicable 
rational basis analysis in history and context, proposing that: 
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What class is harmed 
by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a “tradition of disfavor” by our laws? What is 
the public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the characteristic of the 
disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment?  In most cases, the answer to these 
questions will tell us whether the statute has a “rational basis.”320   
 
Justice Stevens’ version of relevance was thus “given direction through the incorporation of 
normative premises that reflect a social vision of equality.”321  His vision of rationality involved a 
balancing of interests that inquired into whether the legislator could reasonably have concluded that 
the achievement of its purpose warranted the harm caused: “The term ‘rational,’ of course, includes a 
requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a 
legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the disadvantaged class.”322  Thus, his analysis 
directed focus on the circumstances of disadvantaged groups without requiring categorical assertions 
about whether or not particular kinds of classifications are presumptively irrational.323 
Justice Marshall similarly objected to the Court’s rigid approach to tiered scrutiny, but 
offered a different proposal: a sliding scale of review which he referred to as a “spectrum of 
standards.324  Justice Marshall charged the majority approach with “focusing obsessively on the 
appropriate label to give its standard of review,” and questioned the validity of the bases relied upon 
to determine suspect classification. 325  He cautioned that a formalistic understanding of the political 
process rationale fails to account for the invidious nature of gender discrimination, and that a 
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decontextualized immutability analysis may improperly emphasize grounds such as height.326  Rather 
than focus on any “single talisman,” Justice Marshall called for a relational focus on the actual, lived 
experiences of groups, noting that “the political powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its 
defining trait are relevant only insofar as they point to a social and cultural isolation that gives the 
majority little reason to respect or be concerned with the group’s interests and needs.” 327  Rather than 
the mechanical process of assigning scrutiny with reference to abstract classifications, Justice 
Marshall prescribed an open-textured balancing approach, in which “concentration must be placed 
upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class 
discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state 
interests in support of the classification.”328  In this analysis, Marshall directed, “[E]xperience, not 
abstract logic, must be the primary guide,” and “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”329  
But despite these objections, tiered scrutiny has yet to be repudiated by a majority of the 
Court.  The above survey confirms observations that the awarding of suspect status has not followed, 
or even purported to follow, any clear framework for the addition of new grounds.  The common 
thread appears to be concern over political or social disadvantage, but Rodriguez and Cleburne 
establish that such factors are insufficient in themselves to attract heightened scrutiny.  In any event, 
as Yoshino and Goldberg have observed, the Court does not appear interested in clarifying its 
approach, or seriously considering the extension of heightened scrutiny to new groups. 
One further development in the equal protection jurisprudence requires our attention here.  
As tiered scrutiny hardened into doctrine, laws that used racial classifications to ameliorate the 
circumstances of disadvantaged groups (i.e. affirmative action) posed a special problem.  As set out 
                                               
326 Ibid at 472, fn 2. 
327 Ibid.  Emphasis added. 
328 Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471 at 520-521 (1970). 
329 Cleburne, supra note 178 at 472, fn 2, citing New York Trust Co v Eisner, 256 US 345 at 349 (1921). 
69 
 
above, the suspect class doctrine was largely focused on identifying disadvantaged groups.  It 
remained unclear, however, how the Court should approach categorizations deployed to the 
advantage of such groups.  In the 1978 Bakke decision, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion laid the 
groundwork for the approach which would ultimately be endorsed by the majority of the Court.330  
That case considered a constitutional challenge by a white male medical school applicant who had 
been rejected twice for admission to the University of California at Davis.  Mr. Bakke complained 
that he would have been admitted but for the medical school’s affirmative action program, under 
which 16 out of 100 places were effectively reserved for racial minority students.331  Among his 
arguments before the Court, he contended that the school’s affirmative action program violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.  In so arguing, he proposed that, because the program engaged racial 
classification, it should be subject to heightened scrutiny.  The state, in defending the program, cited 
the Carolene Products footnote, and argued that heightened scrutiny “should be reserved for 
classifications that disadvantage ‘discrete and insular minorities.’”332  Justice Powell rejected the 
state’s argument, holding that ‘discrete and insular minority’ status “may be relevant in deciding 
whether or not to add new types of classifications to the list of ‘suspect categories,’” but that “[r]acial 
and ethnic classifications…are subject to stringent examination without regard to these additional 
characteristics.”333   
 Among the reasons offered for this decision, a version of Yoshino’s pluralism anxiety was 
prominent.  Justice Powell remarked that, while the Slaughter-house Cases had emphasized the 
particular historical purpose of alleviating discrimination against African Americans, by the time the 
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famous footnote was proffered, America had become a “Nation of minorities” for which such 
targeted protection was no longer possible or desirable.334  In the contemporary context, Justice 
Powell argued, it is “too late” to posit a form of equal protection that “permits the recognition of 
special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded to others.”335  Noting that 
even “the white ‘majority’ itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay 
claim to a history of prior discrimination,” Powell concludes that “[t]here is no principled basis for 
deciding which groups would merit “heightened judicial solicitude” and which would not.”336  The 
task, he observes, would also require the Court to constantly re-evaluate which groups, in a given 
social and historical moment, achieve a “societal injury…thought to exceed some arbitrary level of 
tolerability” warranting “preferential classification.”337   Powell protests that changing social 
circumstances would require a constant re-assessment of “new judicial rankings” that would engage a 
“variable sociological and political analysis” that exceeds the proper role of the Court.338   
 As noted above, Justice Powell’s reasons in Bakke were not supported by a majority of the 
Court.  Debate persisted in the Court’s decisions as to the proper approach to affirmative action cases 
until the 1995 decision in Adarand. 339  In Adarand, the Court endorsed Justice Powell’s reasons in 
Bakke, holding that all racial classifications—by any government actor, and regardless of purposes or 
effects—should be subjected to the highest scrutiny.  The decision was made over Justice Stevens 
and Justice Ginsburg’s protestations that “[t]he consistency that the Court espouses” in treating all 
racial classifications with the same heightened suspicion, “would disregard the difference between a 
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‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”340  But the rule that “benign” racial classifications should 
be subjected to heightened scrutiny continues to hold.  Most recently, the Supreme Court vacated a 
Court of Appeals decision to uphold a University of Texas affirmative action program on the basis 
that the Court of Appeals failed to apply the strict scrutiny required by Adarand.341  Justice Ginsburg, 
conceding to the Court’s settled approach, objected only that on her assessment the Court of Appeals 
had already held the impugned affirmative action program to the strict scrutiny called for by Justice 
Powell in Bakke.342  
 Thus, the Court’s current approach blends a symmetrical hostility towards certain 
“classifications,” with an unwillingness to extend heightened protections to new “suspect classes.”  A 
vast critical commentary, some of which will be addressed more fully below, has addressed the 
perceived inconsistencies and injustices of this approach.343  Before moving on to consider a 
relational response to these developments, however, the following chapter will set out the doctrinal 
evolution of the Canadian approach to grounds of discrimination. 
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CHAPTER 4  
GROUPS AND GROUNDS IN CANADIAN EQUALITY LAW 
 
The U.S. Equal Protection Clause was born in a nation recovering from a bloody civil war, 
and facing the very immediate and material concerns of a vast population of newly-emancipated 
slaves whose legal status was deeply contested and uncertain.  By all accounts, the Equal Protection 
Clause was, at its inception, aimed primarily at protecting that particular social group.  Canada’s 
constitutional equality provision emerged in very different circumstances.  The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms was born in the 1980s, crafted in consultation with independent advisory 
groups, and following the solicitation and submission of briefs from members of the public, and three 
months of hearings before a joint committee of the House of Commons and the Senate.344  The 
resultant equality provision was therefore “shaped in large part by women, as well as by advocates 
for the disabled and other disadvantaged groups in Canadian society.”345  Canada’s constitutional 
equality provision was also drafted and interpreted after much of the American constitutional history 
set out above had already unfurled—the famous footnote, the adoption of tiered scrutiny, and the 
striking of affirmative action provisions under strict scrutiny.  The drafting and interpretation of the 
Canadian constitutional equality provision took the American equal protection experience as both 
exemplar and cautionary tale.346   
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Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: 
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability.347 
 
As with all rights enumerated in the Charter, s. 15 equality rights are “subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society,” pursuant to the limitation provision set out in s. 1 of the Charter. 
 The textual differences between this provision and the terse American guarantee of “equal 
protection of the laws” are apparent.  First, the Canadian protection expressly provides a lengthy list 
of grounds, including grounds such as age and disability which have not attracted special scrutiny 
under U.S. equal protection analysis.348  Moreover, the list of grounds is prefaced by the phrase “and, 
in particular”—a grammatical invitation to consider claims that do not necessarily engage the listed 
grounds.  Second, the limitations clause opened up a possibility (arguably not adequately taken up by 
the Court) of separating the identification of a rights violation from consideration of whether that 
violation was justifiable.  Raj Anand notes that this structural separation of s. 1 from the equality 
provision is distinguishable from the American provision which casts equality rights in “expansive, 
largely unqualified terms,” with the result that “the U.S. Supreme Court was forced to incorporate 
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general welfare interests into the definition of the right itself and into the analysis of what constitutes 
an infringement of that right.”349 
Finally, subsection 15(2), which provides express Constitutional sanction to affirmative 
measures aimed at ameliorating conditions of group disadvantage, was included as a direct response 
to the American experience with judicial review of affirmative action programs.  David Lepofsky and 
Jerome Bickenbach report that s. 15(2) was commonly referred to in the Charter’s early days as an 
“anti-Bakke” provision, referencing a desire to avoid the calls of “reverse discrimination” evident in 
the U.S. Bakke decision. 350  The Ontario Court of Appeal similarly concluded that “[s]ection 15(2) 
was undoubtedly included in the Charter to silence this debate in Canada and to avoid litigation 
similar to Bakke.”351  Elsewhere, I have elaborated the evolution of the Court’s treatment of 
ameliorative programs under s. 15(2).352  Here I will confine myself to remarking that the Canadian 
jurisprudence has not followed the U.S. in striking ameliorative programs under their constitutional 
equality protections.  Instead, s. 15(2) has been interpreted to direct that, where the government can 
establish that a program is rationally connected to the objective of ameliorating conditions of group 
disadvantage, it is effectively insulated from review under s. 15(1) of the Charter.353 
The approach to groups and grounds under consideration in the present study emerged in the 
context of the Court’s s. 15(1) jurisprudence.  In the Supreme Court’s first s. 15 decision, Andrews, 
the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a British Columbia rule that restricted membership in the 
provincial bar association to Canadian citizens.  At this early stage, the Court resisted creating a clear 
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“test” for s. 15 analysis, cautioning that it would be “unwise, if not foolhardy, to attempt to provide 
exhaustive definitions of phrases which by their nature are not susceptible of easy 
definition and which are intended to provide a framework for the ‘unremitting protection’ of equality 
rights in the years to come.”354  But despite this wariness, the Court was ready at the outset to give a 
starring role to the grounds of discrimination listed in the constitutional text, unanimously endorsing 
an interpretive structure which they termed the “enumerated and analogous grounds approach.”355  
Under this approach, the listed grounds, and grounds determined to be analogous thereto, would 
serve the function of “screening out the obviously trivial and vexatious claim,” while leaving “any 
consideration of the reasonableness of the enactment; indeed, any consideration of factors which 
could justify the discrimination and support the constitutionality of the impugned enactment” to the s. 
1 inquiry, where the government bears the burden of proof.356  As to the s. 15(1)  inquiry, the Court 
endorsed the following account of the purpose of the grounds inquiry: “one may look to whether or not 
there is ‘discrimination’, in the pejorative sense of that word, and as to whether the categories are 
based upon the grounds enumerated or grounds analogous to them.  The inquiry, in effect, 
concentrates upon the personal characteristics of those who claim to have been unequally 
treated.   Questions of stereotyping, of historical disadvantagement, in a word, of prejudice, are the 
focus…”357 
In Andrews, the Court concluded that citizenship was sufficiently analogous to the listed 
grounds to warrant s. 15 protection.  Justice McIntyre’s brief consideration of this point adopted the 
American ‘discrete and insular minority’ formulation: “Non-citizens, lawfully permanent residents of 
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357 Ibid at 180, citing Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v Canada (Attorney General), [1987] 2 FC 359 at 367-
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Canada, are—in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co….a 
good example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’ who come within the protection of s. 15.”358  Justice 
Wilson, concurring in Justice McIntyre’s finding of a s. 15 violation, repeated his reference to Carolene 
Products and elaborated on the underlying political process rationale: “[r]elative to citizens, non-citizens 
are a group lacking in political power and as such vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and 
their rights to equal concern and respect violated.”359  She emphasized the vulnerability that non-citizens 
faced in the political sphere due to their lack of voting rights, and found that for this reason “non-citizens 
fall into an analogous category to those specifically enumerated in s. 15.”360  Justice Wilson was 
emphatic that this determination is properly made “in the context of the place of the group in the entire 
social, political and legal fabric of our society.”361  This attention to context, she added, must account for 
changing “political and social circumstances” which might in turn change the shape and definition of the 
relevant social groups: “It can be anticipated that the discrete and insular minorities of tomorrow will 
include groups not recognized as such today.”362 
In the cases following Andrews, the Court continued to deploy the term “discrete and insular 
minority” in defining analogous grounds, emphasizing social and historical disadvantage when 
assessing proposed grounds of discrimination.363  Disadvantage was the analytic cornerstone, even 
where factors like “immutability” were referred to by members of the Court.364  In Justice Wilson’s 
unanimous decision in Turpin, the Court rejected a claim that s. 15 was violated by the differential 
                                               
358 Andrews, supra note 189 at 183. 
359 Ibid at 152. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid at 152-153. 
363 See, for example, Turpin, supra note 354 at 1331-33.  
364 See, for example, the reasons of Justice La Forest in Andrews, supra note 189 at 330.  Dale Gibson surveys 
the presence of various factors during this early period in “Analogous Grounds of Discrimination under the 
Canadian Charter: Much Ado About Next to Nothing” (1991) 29 Alberta L Rev 772.  Gibson concedes, 
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availability of judge-alone trials for identical Criminal Code offences as between Ontario and 
Alberta.  In rejecting the proposition that the claim engaged an analogous ground, Justice Wilson, 
writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed that, “[i]n determining whether there is discrimination on 
grounds relating to the personal characteristics of the individual or group, it is important to look…to 
the larger social, political and legal context.... A finding that there is discrimination will, I think, in 
most but perhaps not all cases, necessarily entail a search for disadvantage that exists apart from and 
independent of the particular legal distinction being challenged.”365  She emphasized, moreover, that 
this attention to context and “search for disadvantage” might mean that a proposed ground can be 
“analogous” in some cases but not others, depending on whether group disadvantage was present in a 
given context.  In Turpin, wherein the Court found that the claimant’s province of residence did not 
engage a protected ground, Justice Wilson qualified this holding: “I would not wish to suggest that a 
person's province of residence or place of trial could not in some circumstances be a personal 
characteristic of the individual or group capable of constituting a ground of discrimination. I simply 
say that it is not so here” since the claimants “do not constitute a disadvantaged group in Canadian 
society within the contemplation of s. 15”366  Similarly, in Généreux, the Court found that in the 
context before the Court, military personnel were not subject to unconstitutional discrimination when 
they were required to appear before the military (rather than civilian) justice system.  The Court 
noted that military personnel were not disadvantaged in the present circumstances, but stipulated that 
if “for instance, that after a period of massive demobilization at the end of hostilities, returning 
military personnel…suffer from disadvantages and discrimination peculiar to their status,” they 
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“might constitute a class of persons analogous to those enumerated in s. 15(1) under those 
circumstances.”367 
  In 1995, the Court released a trilogy of decisions which revealed a Court divided over the proper 
interpretation of s. 15.  All three cases involved proposed analogous grounds: Egan considered alleged 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation;368 Miron considered alleged discrimination on the 
basis of marital status;369 and Thibeaudeau considered alleged discrimination against divorced 
custodial parents.370  Elsewhere, I have more fully elaborated the doctrinal tests associated with the 
three approaches emergent in this trilogy.371  Here, I confine my remarks to the stances that each of 
the three judicial cohorts took towards groups and grounds. 
Justices La Forest, Lamer, Major and Gonthier endorsed an approach which focused on 
whether or not a distinction was based on “irrelevant personal characteristics.”372  Under this 
“relevancy” approach, the enumerated grounds exemplified personal characteristics which have often 
formed the basis of irrelevant distinctions; analogous grounds would be defined with reference to the 
relevancy of the proposed ground in relation to the particular legislative objective in issue.373  On this 
account, it “may be useful” to consider group disadvantage, but only insofar as it assists in 
illuminating the presence of an irrelevant distinction.374  Because of the deep connection between 
analogousness and impugned legislative objective on this account, a ground may be found analogous 
in some cases and not in others.  In Miron, for example, the justices of the relevancy coalition 
                                               
367 R v Généreux, [1992] 1 SCR 259 at 311. 
368 Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513 [Egan]. 
369 Miron v Trudel, (1995) 124 DLR (4th) 693 [Miron]. 
370 Thibaudeau v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 627 [Thibaudeau]. 
371 Jessica Eisen, “On Shaky Grounds: Poverty and Analogous Grounds under the Charter” (2013) Canadian 
Journal of Poverty Law (forthcoming). 
372 Thibaudeau, supra note 370 at 682.  Miron, supra note 369 at 702. 
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concluded that “marital status is an example of a ground which, while analogous in certain respects, 
cannot be so with respect to those attributes and effects which serve to define marriage itself.”375 In 
the circumstances of the instant case, marital status was found to be sufficiently relevant to the 
benefit in issue that it was not analogous to the enumerated grounds.  This coalition also emphasized 
the importance that the irrelevant characteristic be a “personal characteristic,” holding in Thibaudeau 
that groups should not be “subdivided” by income level since income is not, in their view, a 
“characteristic attaching to the individual.”376  This coalition did not delve into the relevancy of 
sexual orientation in Egan, finding on other grounds that the distinction was not, in any event, 
discriminatory.377  
Justices McLachlin, Sopinka, Cory, and Iacobucci espoused an interpretive approach to s. 15 
that focused on “stereotyping.”  These justices proposed that the enumerated grounds indicated 
historical bases for stereotypical decision-making; analogous grounds would be determined on the 
basis of the likelihood that they might form the basis of stereotypical decision-making.378  Despite 
apparent similarities between a prescribed focus on “irrelevant” or “stereotypical” decision-making, 
379 advocates of the stereotyping approach cast a wider net for assessing analogous grounds, listing a 
range of factors relevant to assessing vulnerability to stereotype: whether the groups suffers from 
historical disadvantage; whether the group constitutes a “discrete and insular minority” vulnerable to 
being overlooked by majoritarian politics; whether the distinction is made on the basis of a “personal 
characteristic” and “by extension” whether the distinction is based on “personal and immutable 
                                               
375 Ibid at 707. 
376 Thibaudeau, supra note 370 at 687. 
377 Egan, supra note 368 at 529. 
378 Miron, supra note 369 at 741. 
379 See Justice Gonthier’s assessment that the two approaches share a common goal: “a criterion defined in 
terms of stereotype based on presumed group characteristics, rather than on the basis of merit, capacity or 
circumstances, is but an elaboration of the concept of relevance.” Ibid at 708. 
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characteristics”; whether the ground in issue is comparable to any particular listed ground; and 
whether the ground had been recognized by other judges or in human rights legislation.380  These 
factors were to be understood as “analytical tools,” and a proposed analogous ground need not prove 
the presence of every listed factor.381  The “unifying principle” in the analogous grounds assessment 
is the desire to avoid distinctions “on the basis of some preconceived perception about the attributed 
characteristics of a group rather than the true capacity, worth or circumstances of the 
individual.”382  In Miron, the stereotyping coalition systematically considered each factor and 
concluded that marital status warranted recognition as an analogous ground because the “essential 
elements necessary to engage the overarching purpose of s. 15(1)—violation of dignity and 
freedom,  an historical group disadvantage, and the danger of stereotypical group-based decision-
making—are present.”383  A similarly wide-ranging assessment of the social circumstances of 
divorced custodial parents—including such material considerations as “standard of living”—led 
Justice McLachlin to declare that group to be analogous in Thibaudeau.384  In Egan, this coalition 
again provided a wide-ranging and historically rooted assessment of prejudice and disadvantage 
facing “homosexual individuals and homosexual couples,” concluding that sexual orientation was an 
analogous ground of discrimination.385 
Both the relevancy and the stereotyping approaches represented a departure from the 
decidedly disadvantage-oriented focus of the Andrews era.  The relevancy approach could be 
deployed without ever inquiring into the social and political power of the groups affected by 
impugned legislation.  While the stereotyping approach did include some social contextual concerns 
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(in particular, historical disadvantage and discrete and insular minority status), these stood on equal 
footing with more abstract considerations (personal characteristics; immutability; and abstract 
analogy to other particular grounds).  Attention to disadvantage did not, under this approach, operate 
with the same decisive force as it did under Andrews.  This receding focus on social context, 
moreover, was accompanied by another doctrinal shift—common to both the relevancy and 
stereotyping approaches—that further insulated the grounds analysis from relational concerns: the 
grounds assessment shifted its shape from that of an analytical tool to that of a freestanding “test” 
that could defeat a discrimination claim at the outset.386 
 Only Justice L’Heureux-Dubé advocated an approach that continued to emphasize group 
disadvantage and open-textured analysis.  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé proposed that discrimination 
should be assessed in context, with reference to the nature of that actual group(s) affected, and the 
nature of the interest impacted by the impugned differential treatment.  She prescribed an inquiry into 
“groups rather than grounds, and discriminatory impact rather than discriminatory potential.”387  She 
posited that discrimination should be found more readily in cases where serious interests were 
engaged, and/or where a “socially vulnerable” group is disadvantaged by a legislative distinction.388 
Throughout the trilogy, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concurred with the stereotyping coalition’s findings 
that the impugned legislation violated s. 15, but emphasized that she rejected a talismanic focus on 
grounds which she saw as encouraging “too much analysis at the wrong level.”389  Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé warned that by “looking at the grounds for the distinction instead of at 
the impact of the distinction on particular groups, we risk undertaking an analysis that is distanced 
                                               
386 The majority in Symes v Canada, [1993] 4 SCR 695 at 756-757 observed that under Andrews the 
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and desensitized from real people's real experiences.”390  She cautioned that reliance on “appropriate 
categories” gave rise to a risk of “relying on conventions and stereotypes…[that] further entrench a 
discriminatory status quo.”391  Rejecting an approach that was overly focused on the characteristics 
of claimants, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé offered the distinctly relational insight that “More often than 
not, disadvantage arises from the way in which society treats particular individuals, rather than from 
any characteristic inherent in those individuals.” 392 
 The Court sought to resolve the conflicting trilogy approaches, and offer a unified “test” to be 
applied in constitutional equality claims in Law. 393  In Law, the Court directed a three-part test for s. 
15 analysis: 
 (A)  Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others 
on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the 
claimant’s already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively 
differential treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal 
characteristics? 
  
(B)  Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated and 
analogous grounds? 
  
and 
  
(C) Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a 
benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of 
presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating 
or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as 
a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, respect, 
and consideration?394 
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The third and final inquiry—commonly referred to as the “dignity” analysis—called for assessment 
of four “contextual factors”: (1) Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability 
experienced by the individual or group in issue; (2) the correspondence between the ground(s) on 
which the claim is based and the actual needs, capacities or circumstances of the claimant; (3) the 
ameliorative purpose or effect of the law; and (4) the nature and scope of the interest affected.395  
Shortly after Law, the Court decided Corbiere, a case concerning the rights of off-reserve 
aboriginal band members.396  Together, Law and Corbiere conclusively reshaped the Court’s 
approach to defining analogous grounds.  First, the Court confirmed the trend towards a threshold 
grounds inquiry emergent in the approaches proposed by the relevancy and stereotyping cohorts 
under the trilogy.  The Court held in Corbiere that the analogous grounds inquiry would now serve a 
“screening out” function, whereby claims which failed to make out a distinction on the basis of an 
approved ground would merit no further inquiry.397  This move was perhaps incipient in the Law 
decision’s isolation of the grounds inquiry at the second step in the three-part test.  The Law Court 
had left the door open to claims based upon multiple grounds, but emphasized that, for claims based 
on a “newly postulated analogous ground, or on the basis of a combination of different grounds,” the 
second step of the Law test “must focus upon the issue of whether and why a ground or confluence of 
grounds is analogous to those listed in s. 15(1).”398  
Second, the Court in Corbiere emphasized that this threshold inquiry was to be conducted in 
the abstract, rather than in the particular context of the case before the Court.  The grounds were 
found to represent “a legal expression of a general characteristic, not a contextual, fact-based 
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conclusion about whether discrimination exists in a particular case.” 399  Analogousness was no 
longer to be determined, as the Andrews Court had suggested, with references to the particular social 
relationships giving rise to a given claim.  According to the Cobiere majority, “we should not speak 
of analogous grounds existing in one circumstance and not another.”400 
The Court further elaborated that this analogous grounds analysis—now an abstract, 
threshold test—should hinge on an inquiry into whether the proposed ground constituted an 
immutable or “constructively immutable” personal characteristic: “the thrust of identification of 
analogous grounds at the second stage of the Law analysis is to reveal grounds based on 
characteristics that we cannot change or that the government has no legitimate interest in expecting 
us to change to receive equal treatment under the law.”401  The government has no legitimate interest, 
on this view, in requiring people to alter those personal characteristics that are “changeable only at 
unacceptable cost to personal identity.” 402  The Court emphasized that this test was rooted in analogy 
to the listed grounds: race was offered as an example of a listed ground that is “actually immutable”; 
religion served as an example of a “constructively immutable personal characteristic.”  Strikingly, the 
Court argued that the immutability inquiry displaced any need for distinct inquiry into social or 
political disadvantage: 
Other factors identified in the cases as associated with the enumerated and analogous 
grounds, like the fact that the decision adversely impacts on a discrete and insular minority or 
a group that has been historically discriminated against, may be seen to flow from the central 
concept of immutable or constructively immutable personal characteristics, which too often 
have served as illegitimate and demeaning proxies for merit-based decision making.403 
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The Corbiere decision remains the Court’s leading statement on the content and doctrinal 
significance of the analogous grounds inquiry.404  In Kapp and Withler the Court revisited other 
aspects of the Law formula, replacing the multi-part dignity analysis with an inquiry into the 
perpetuation of disadvantage through prejudice and stereoptype.405  The analogous grounds inquiry 
set out in Corbiere, however, remains untouched by this latest revision of the Court’s equality 
analysis. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that there is no basis for the Court’s assertion in Corbiere that 
attention to historical disadvantage “may be seen to flow from” (constructive) immutability, and that 
in practice the lower courts have taken this doctrinal directive as an invitation to ignore 
disadvantage.406  Rosalind Dixon has similarly observed that “[t]he actual or constructive 
immutability of an individual characteristic will, at best, be only tangentially relevant to these criteria 
of political power.”407  Whether or not (constructively) immutable personal characteristics such as 
race and religion in fact characterize disadvantaged groups, there is no question that such 
characteristics are symmetrical: if race is immutable, it is equally so for black and white; if religion is 
constructively immutable, it is equally so for Christianity and Islam.  As Sebastién Grammond 
described the reasoning in Corbiere: “the focus is on the ground of distinction, rather than on the 
vulnerable group delineated by that ground.”408 
                                               
404 For a recent Supreme Court decision confirming Corbiere as the governing test for analogousness, see 
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 Dixon has observed that the Corbiere decision also represents a shift in analogical reasoning 
that results in a greater level of abstraction.  On Dixon’s account, the listed grounds constitute 
“baselines” from which the Court analogizes.  The Court’s early jurisprudence represented a process 
of “multi-pronged” analogy, from which numerous points of similarity might be relied upon to draw 
analogies to “one or more of the existing baseline constitutional categories.”409  For example, the 
Court’s recognition of marital status as an analogous ground in Miron focused on an anti-
stereotyping rationale, while immutability figured more prominently in the Court’s adoption of 
sexual orientation as an analogous ground in Egan.410  The Corbiere focus on immutability, however, 
represents a “synthetic” approach by which courts “attempt first to identify a common thread or 
denominator behind existing constitutional categories, and only then…proceed to compare new 
(claimed) constitutional categories with a constitution’s existing baselines.”411  Because the listed 
grounds in the Canadian constitution are so heterogeneous, Dixon notes that a synthetic approach 
requires courts to adopt highly abstract and formal reasoning.412 In Dixon’s view, “The more diverse 
existing constitutional categories, the more difficult it will be for courts to find commonality among 
those grounds in their scope, significance or underlying purpose; and thus, the more likely it is a 
court will need to resort to higher levels of abstraction in order to identify even some form of internal 
coherence or common denominator.”413  Among the dangers Dixon associates with such abstraction, 
is that it is likely to engage a “form of ‘lofty’ reasoning with little or no connection to underlying 
constitutional commitments or concerns.”414 
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 Both Dixon and I have observed that the lower courts have interpreted the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s more formalist and decontextualized Corbiere analysis to require increased resistance to 
new grounds—particularly in the case of claims rooted in economic disadvantage.415  But here I will 
emphasize another important trend emerging at the Supreme Court level.  Since Corbiere, the Court 
has shown signs that it may now treat the existing list of analogous grounds as fixed.  In a recent 
Supreme Court case considering discrimination on the basis of the previously-recognized analogous 
ground of marital status, the judicial reasons focused on questions about whether marital status is 
truly immutable, and whether unmarried couples continue to face discrimination.416  But these 
debates took place only in the context of assessing prejudice and stereotype, not in revisiting whether 
marital status constitutes an analogous ground.  Even those justices who proposed that marriage was 
a chosen status, and that social stigma against unmarried couples has waned, accepted without 
hesitation that the established position of marital status on the ‘list’ of analogous grounds was not up 
for debate.417  If this were a mere question of ‘constitutional displacement’—considering the same 
issues in a different doctrinal forum—this might not matter much.418  But the threshold nature of the 
grounds analysis persists, such that for proposed grounds that do not pass the threshold 
analogousness inquiry, there is nowhere for these concerns to displace to.      
 This brings us to the most consequential aspect of the Court’s possible emergent treatment of 
the existing list as fixed.  The Court has repeatedly shied away from considering proposed grounds 
that have produced conflicting results in the lower courts.419  As I have set out in detail elsewhere, the 
question of whether and when new grounds associated with economic disadvantage might ground 
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equality claims has arisen persistently in the lower courts.420  As Bruce Ryder and Taufiq Hashmani 
have observed, the Supreme Court of Canada has chosen time and again not to deal with cases 
“raising the issue of whether poverty or receipt of social assistance is an analogous ground of 
discrimination.”421  In the two cases that the Supreme Court has considered since Corbiere where a 
proposed analogous ground was advanced (both dealing with agricultural workers—one instance of 
which was referenced at the beginning of this paper), the Court declined to address the analogous 
grounds question, preferring instead to decide both cases on other grounds.422  
 Since the recognition of aboriginality residence in Corbiere, no new grounds have been 
recognized; in fact, neither have any new grounds been rejected in the nearly 15 years since the 
Corbiere test was established.  The Court continues to reject leave applications relating to the most 
persistently proposed new grounds, and the lower courts continue to apply the restrictive and abstract 
(constructive) immutability standard directed by the Supreme Court in Corbiere.423  The following 
chapter will set out a debate in the Canadian scholarship over the proper shape of the ‘groups’ and 
‘grounds’ inquiries, comparing the terms of that debate to a related line of inquiry in the U.S. 
scholarship.  I hope to show that a relational framework can productively reshape these discussions, 
and open up new directions for attending to the relational context of equality claims. 
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CHAPTER 5  
RETHINKING CLASS(IFICATION): RELATIONAL APPROACHES TO DOCTRINE 
 
In the first chapter of this paper, I examined the broad contours of relational theory, 
emphasizing relational theory’s core insights that rights are best understood in the context of the 
relationships they produce; that categories of salient difference are socially defined; and that 
reflexive use of categories often obscures our ability to perceive and respond to justice problems.  
After pausing to consider the uneasy fit between relational approaches and doctrinal projects, the 
following two chapters examined the evolution of the U.S. suspect classification doctrine, and the 
Canadian analogous grounds analysis.  This chapter will elaborate doctrinal debates arising from the 
Canadian and American constitutional equality jurisprudence, arguing that the relational insights set 
out in the first chapter might shed fresh light on these problems. 
 Before proceeding to set out the debates in question, however, it is important to recall the 
vast differences in the doctrinal context in which the American classification inquiry and the 
Canadian grounds approach operate.  I have alluded to some of these in Chapter 2, but they bear 
emphasizing in the context of the comparison I will elaborate here.  First, I do not wish my emphasis 
on the hesitation to recognize new grounds in both jurisdictions to elide the significant differences in 
the lists of grounds that have access to special constitutional equality protection in these two 
jurisdictions.  Canada’s constitutional text has enumerated equality protections on the basis of age 
and mental or physical disability—statuses which have been expressly denied heightened scrutiny in 
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the U.S. context.424  The Supreme Court of Canada recognized sexual orientation as an analogous 
ground over fifteen years ago, while the United States Supreme Court continues to decline to address 
persistent calls to recognize this as a suspect classification.425  The closing of the canon, as Yoshino 
puts it, thus has very different implications for equality-seeking groups in these countries. 
 Second, and cutting the other way, the doctrinal function of the grounds analysis can be 
formally determinative of outcomes in a way that suspect classification is not.  Despite arguments 
that strict scrutiny can be “fatal in fact,” the U.S. Court can and does recognize equality violations on 
rational basis review.426  As described in the preceding analysis, however, the Canadian analogous 
grounds inquiry now stands as a threshold question, capable of defeating claims without further 
analysis.  I have used the phrase “special protection” to capture the role of the Canadian grounds 
analysis and the U.S. suspect class analysis, but in fact, in the Canadian context, a claimant who 
cannot establish an analogous ground under the current approach attracts no equality protection at all.  
 Third, in both jurisdictions, the grounds and classification inquiries are merely doctrinal first-
steps in the respective equality doctrines of these two countries.  And the remaining steps are 
important.  The United States has pursued an equality doctrine focused on invidious purpose and 
facial classifications, refusing to recognize claims based on unintentional disparate impact, even in 
respect of suspect classes.427  The Supreme Court of Canada, though sometimes criticized for not 
going far enough to protect against unintentional discrimination, has not required claimants to 
establish an intent to discriminate, or a facial distinction in treatment.428  Finally, the U.S. equal 
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protection inquiry is squarely focused on the rationality of state action, not on the impact or 
experience of petitioners.  Even on strict scrutiny, the inquiry simply calls for a tighter connection 
between legitimate state objectives and the means employed.  The Canadian equality doctrine 
prescribes that distinctions on the basis of prohibited grounds may not perpetuate disadvantage 
through prejudice and stereotype.  While this formulation has been charged with moving Canada 
closer to the U.S. focus on rationality, the Canadian doctrine’s focus on disadvantage, prejudice and 
stereotype are decidedly more claimant-focused than its American counterpart. 
 This brings us back to Professor Nedelsky’s conclusion that Canadian equality doctrine is 
more amenable to relational analysis than U.S. equal protection analysis.  My aim in this chapter will 
be to offer a relational reframing of two related debates in these jurisdictions, not to elaborate a 
comparative assessment of the receptivity of the respective doctrines to relational analysis.  
Nonetheless, I think it is important to express my agreement with Professor Nedelsky’s conclusions 
on this point.  On the whole, the U.S. equal protection analysis offers little doctrinal space for 
consideration of relational factors.  By comparison, the Canadian approach directs courts to attend to 
the social context of claims in assessing the perpetuation of disadvantage.  Thus the hardening and 
abstraction of the classification and grounds analysis have differing practical effects.  In the U.S. 
jurisprudence, the suspect class analysis offered an unusually rare doctrinal opening for attention to 
social context.  In the Canadian context, for claims that are able to show distinction on the basis of a 
protected ground, there remains further doctrinal space for such considerations. 
From Suspect Classes to Suspect Classifications  
 In his incisive article “The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda,” Jed Rubenfeld suggests in an 
“exploratory vein” that a number of the United States Supreme Court’s doctrinal turns can best be 
understood as manifesting a political rejection of “the ‘liberal’ antidiscrimination movement” in the 
face of perceived threats to “fundamental American values and freedoms,” including “the erosion of 
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meritocracy, the creation of a sense of entitlement among undeserving people, the insistence that 
homosexuality be protected instead of condemned, the fomenting of a victimization culture, and so 
on.”429  Among the phenomena Rubenfeld associates with this movement is an “important doctrinal 
shift, finally realized in [Adarand] but insufficiently discussed in the literature, from suspect classes 
to suspect classifications as the linchpin of strict scrutiny in equal protection law.”430  Elsewhere, 
Rubenfeld describes this as “a momentous, if often unnoticed shift” that “never is acknowledged or 
explained in the case law.”431  Rubenfeld elaborates that, though the term “suspect class” was “never 
precisely defined,” it was “clear enough” that it “referred to minority groups historically treated 
with…prejudice and hostility… Accordingly, the most prominent indicators of a group’s 
‘suspectness’ included a history of discrimination and a relative lack of political power.”432    
 Rubenfeld proposes that the application of heightened scrutiny in affirmative action cases 
“essentially treats whites as if they were a suspect class, even though this result would violate 
everything the Court has ever said about the types of groups that qualify for suspect class status.”433  
Rubenfeld finds this result particularly unsettling in light of the fact that “[p]oor people, veterans, 
disabled people, railroad workers, ophthalmologists—just about any minority group can be singled 
out by law for special advantages in the allocation of government benefits or opportunities without 
running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.  But blacks cannot.”434  Thus Rubenfeld posits, “the 
present majority of the Supreme Court essentially uses the Constitution’s phrase ‘the equal protection 
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of the laws’ to force states to deny blacks (and other racial minorities) a legal right enjoyed by many 
other minority groups.”435 
 This concern echoes Reva Siegel’s identification of the Court’s recent emphasis on 
classification as an instance of “preservation through transformation,” whereby status-enforcing 
regimes shift in logical and rhetorical structure under political pressure.  While Siegel’s emphasis in 
“Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects” is on the role of intent analysis, her comments are 
apposite.  Siegel proposes that “the historical narrative the Court invokes to justify its current use of 
strict scrutiny doctrine is highly abstracted, depicting centuries of racial status regulation as a ‘history 
of racial classifications.’”436  She elaborates that “by abstracting the history of racial status 
regulation into a narrative of ‘racial classifications,’ the Court obscures the multiple and mutable 
forms of racial status regulation that have subordinated African Americans since the Founding.”437  
Siegel protests this “highly abstracted standpoint” as being “inattentive to the social meaning of 
racial status regulation.” 438  On her analysis, “classification” represents just one form of a mutable 
system of “status-enforcing state action” that is “mutable in form, evolving in rule structure and 
justificatory rhetoric as it is contested.”439  In the result, “today doctrines of heightened scrutiny 
function primarily to constrain legislatures from adopting policies designed to reduce race and gender 
stratification.”440  In Siegel’s view, the focus on “classification” that has emerged in the Court’s 
affirmative action case law has the effect of “obscuring the myriad forms of state action that 
contribute to the social stratification affirmative action addresses.” 441  
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 Reginald Oh takes up Rubenfeld’s observation that the U.S. Court has shifted its focus from 
“suspect classes” to “suspect classifications,” emphasizing that the “language structure of suspect 
classification analysis made it possible for the Court to develop a suspect classification analysis 
without any reference at all to suspect or vulnerable groups.”442  As Dixon observed of the Canadian 
adoption of the immutability standard, Oh posits that the U.S. move towards classification “moved 
the doctrine up to a higher level of abstraction.”443  Oh argues that a discussion of “traits” like race, 
rather than “groups” like African Americans, “tends to create essentialist discourse about the essence 
or true nature of a particular trait. 444 Oh elaborates that, “Once we begin to talk about the nature of a 
thing like race, then we are engaging in Aristotelian essentialist discourse trying to figure out the true 
essence of things.”445  Thus, Oh explains, a “pure suspect classification analysis” allows for an 
analysis that is “completely divorced from the concerns about the actual, material realities of people 
who continue to suffer from long standing subordination and political isolation.”446  For this reason, 
Oh argues, “the law of suspect classes is more consistent with the anti-caste or anti-subordination 
theory of equal protection, while the law of suspect classifications is more consistent with the anti-
classification or anti-differentiation theory of equal protection.”447 
 Here, Oh evokes Owen Fiss’ foundational articulation of two competing strands of equal 
protection theory: anti-subordination and anti-classification.  In Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, Fiss argued that the Court had been applying an anti-classification principle (originally 
termed by Fiss an “anti-discrimination principle”) whose “foundational concept” was one of “means-
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ends rationality.”448  Suspect classifications, on this account, are “essentially standards for 
determining the requisite degree of fit.”449  Fiss points out that the suspect classification doctrine 
“affords some recognition to the role or importance of social groups” in the anti-classification rule’s 
otherwise individualistic account of equality: “the important fact to note is that almost all of the 
serious candidates for the status of suspect classification are those that coincide with what might be 
conceived of as natural classes—for example, blacks, Chicanos, women, and maybe the poor.”450  In 
fact, Fiss suggests, “it is not at all clear to me that an adequate explanation [as to why certain 
classifications were suspect] can be given that does not recognize the role and importance of social 
groups.”451  On Fiss’ account, therefore, the anti-classification claim to sidestep recognition of social 
groups is a mere “illusion of individualism.”452  But this illusion of individualism, Fiss explains, 
leaves the Courts ill-equipped to deal with important equality problems, including affirmative action: 
“The anti-discrimination principle does not formally acknowledge social groups, such as blacks; nor 
does it offer any special dispensation for conduct that benefits a disadvantaged group.  It only knows 
criteria or classifications; and the color black is as much a racial criterion as the color white.”453 
 Fiss crafted an alternative mediating principle, the “group disadvantaging principle” (since 
referred to as the anti-caste principle or the anti-subordination principle), arising from Fiss’ view that 
“[t]here are natural classes, or social groups, in American society,” and that the historic and 
interpretive significance of discrimination against African Americans as a group requires an Equal 
Protection Clause that responds to this reality.454  The phrase “natural classes” is used to distinguish 
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groups with real social significance from “artificial classes” that are created purely by legislative 
distinctions (for example tax brackets).455  Using the example of African Americans, Fiss elaborates 
his conception of social groups or “natural classes”: “Blacks are viewed as a group; they view 
themselves as a group; their identity is in large part determined by membership in the group; their 
social status is linked to the status of the group.”456  Fiss’ anti-subordination principle would cast the 
Equal Protection Clause as a protection for “specially disadvantaged groups,” defined by “perpetual 
subordination” and “severely circumscribed” political power.457  He posits that the identification of 
such groups may shift with changing social circumstances, and proposes that Justice Marshall’s 
variable standards of protection might provide the requisite flexibility in light of the fact that “Jews 
or women might be entitled to less protection than American Indians, though nonetheless entitled to 
some protection.”458  The focus, in any event, is on the principle that “certain social practices, 
including but not limited to discrimination [i.e. classification], should be condemned not because of 
any unfairness in the transaction attributable to the poor fit between means and ends, but rather 
because such practices create or perpetuate the subordination of [a] group.”459  This approach, Fiss 
posits, is able to account for “status harm” in a way that the anticlassification principle cannot.460 
 Fiss’ focus on the identification of “natural classes” has attracted criticism.  Iris Marion 
Young has argued that “[t]he concept of group that Fiss offered in his essay…poorly serves the end 
of promoting social justice.”461  Young agrees with Fiss’ proposition that “[i]f we care about the 
ways that many individuals have restricted opportunities and suffer various forms of stigmatization 
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and marginalization, we must pay attention to groups,” but worries that the language of “natural 
classes” introduces “reifying language” that elides the reality that “[g]roups are entirely constituted 
by social norms and interaction.”462  Young notes that a broad literature has considered a related anti-
essentialist imperative in the deployment of “groups,” asking “[h]ow is a politics that pays attention 
to group difference to take account of the fact that individuals have multiple group memberships, and 
that there are numerous differences among group members? Should we worry that paying attention to 
social groups may itself have the effect of reinforcing or even enlarging group disadvantage?”463   
Rogers M. Smith has similarly cautioned that Fiss’ distinction between “natural” and 
“artificial” classes risks obscuring the role that law plays in constructing and reinforcing particular 
racial identities.  In Smith’s view, Fiss thus overlooks Angela Harris’ insight that “race law” has 
contributed “to the formation, recognition, and maintenance of racial groups,” rather than simply 
mediating “relationships among these groups.”464  Richard Thompson Ford echoes this sentiment, 
expressing concern that Fiss’ focus on blacks as a “badly off” social group distracts from the reality 
that “blacks were produced as a discrete social group so that they could be treated badly.”465   
Writing years later, Fiss responded that he did not intend the phrase “natural groups” to 
import these essentializing connotations, or to reify particular social groupings.  Fiss responds that 
anti-subordination “does not create group identification,” but rather “acknowledges this reality, and 
seeks to provide a legal principle capable of eradicating the injustice that arises when group 
identification is turned into a system of subjugation.”466  Fiss’ response, however, points to an 
underlying assumption or analytical framework that pervades the perceived choice between “class” 
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and “classification” that Oh and Rubenfeld observe.  The assumption is that a focus on ‘classes’ is 
the best or only route to attending to social context, while a focus on classification must lead us to 
abstraction.  While labelling groups, or perpetuating social labelling, may raise problems, on this 
account, the alternative is to ignore context.  I propose that the relational theoretic accounts surveyed 
in Chapter 1 offer a different way of conceptualizing the need to attend to context.  But before 
moving on to elaborate that approach, I will first turn to a Canadian debate that reveals a parallel but 
distinct conversation about the risks and potential of attending to groups and grounds. 
Groups and Grounds under Section 15 of the Canadian Charter 
 Canadian discussions of the demands of constitutional equality have relied on a distinction 
that is related, but not identical, to Fiss’ distinction between anti-subordination and anti-
classification.  In Canada, approaches to constitutional equality law are generally assessed with 
reference to a distinction between “substantive” and “formal” equality.  Margot Young summarizes 
“substantive equality” as requiring 1) attention to power differentials; 2) sensitivity to the effects of 
law; 3) deployment of a deeply contextual analysis; and 4) recognition of broad and positive state 
duties. 467  Young elaborates that, “terminology appropriate to such power differentials includes the 
notions of oppression and subordination – these are the problems that a substantive equality analysis 
names and seeks to remedy.”468   
 The Canadian Supreme Court has purported to support substantive equality, rejecting the 
alternative “formal equality” of “treating likes alike.”469  Young proposes that formal equality is 
“underpinned by an idealized vision of the liberal individual: autonomous, self-interested and self-
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determined”—the same liberal ideal criticized by the relational theorists discussed in Chapter 1.470  
Young elaborates that the ideal of treating likes alike (also known as the “similarly situated” test) 
operates “in deliberate blindness to such things as race, gender, sexual orientation, and other markers 
of individual, but group based difference.”471  The concern of formal equality is not “outcomes or 
distributional results,” but rather “process or procedure.”472  Thus, Young explains, formal equality 
“does not require careful or subtle calibration of state action in response to nuances of 
individual/group difference.”473  Because it assumes that sameness and difference in treatment is 
permissible so long as it tracks real sameness and differences, “as popular and legal understandings 
of what counts as ‘real’ difference shift, formal equality analyses grow in usefulness and critical 
bite.”474  (This approach echoes the “rights analysis” critiqued by Minow, as set out in Chapter 1.) 
 This distinction between formal and substantive equality shares certain contours of the 
distinction between anti-subordination and anti-classification.  Anti-classification, like formal 
equality, is concerned instead with the propriety of the “lines” used to divide people.  The anti-
classification pre-occupation with the rationality of distinctions echoes the formal inquiry into 
whether legal distinctions accord with “real” differences.  Substantive equality, like anti-
subordination, is directly concerned with actual conditions of social, political and material inequality.  
Substantive equality, however, does not necessarily import Fiss’ anti-subordination concern with 
identifying particular groups in need of special protection; substantive equality casts the concern 
more broadly in terms of attending to power relations and deploying contextual analysis.475  As the 
                                               
470 Young, supra note 198 at 190-191. 
471 Ibid. 
472 Ibid at 192. 
473 Ibid. 
474 Ibid. 
475 Compare Young, ibid at 193-199, with Fiss, supra note 448. 
100 
 
discussion below will show, debates about the proper scope of substantive equality have sometimes, 
but not always, called for identification of such groups. 
Canadian equality scholars have debated whether “grounds of discrimination” or the 
identification of “groups” warranting protection offer the better doctrinal vehicle for promoting 
substantive equality.476  As we saw in Chapter 3, this debate played out in the trilogy era 
jurisprudence, wherein the majority of the Court moved towards a grounds-based approach, while 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé advocated a focus on groups.  (Mirroring the U.S. distinction between 
classes and classifications, ‘grounds’ describe the lines by which ‘groups’ of people are demarcated.)  
Dianne Pothier describes the Canadian debate as follows: “The essence of the critique of grounds is 
the claim that they are an artificial compartmentalization which obscures the complex reality of real 
life.  In contrast, the defense of grounds is based on the contention that they serve to focus attention 
on the real sources of discrimination.”477  Sheppard, in her call for expansive definitions of grounds, 
nicely casts the debate between group-based and grounds-based approaches to equality as a “feminist 
post-modern dilemma” since “[i]t may be politically, strategically or rhetorically important to name a 
social phenomenon sexism, classism or racism, while acknowledging the limits of such categories in 
the same breath.”478   
Pothier herself proposes that “it would be a mistake to abandon or de-emphasize grounds” in 
the manner suggested by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s group-based analysis.479  Pothier acknowledges 
that her difference with Justice L’Heureux-Dubé is one of emphasis rather than true opposition.  In 
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Pothier’s view, “a fuller appreciation of the significance of grounds, rather than a de-emphasis on 
grounds, is what is needed.” 480  Pothier proposes that “a thorough understanding of the grounds of 
discrimination, including intersecting grounds, provides an opportunity for a more complex and 
richer understanding of equality and discrimination, which thereby enables anti-discrimination law to 
be relevant to real people’s real experiences.” 481  Pothier elaborates that “[g]rounds of discrimination 
are not a purely legal construct. They reflect a political and social reality to which the law has, 
belatedly, given recognition. Discrimination was a fact of life long before the law decided that it 
should intervene to prohibit it.”482  Thus, in Pothier’s view, “as long as people and institutions factor 
in grounds both intentionally and structurally, legal analysis must pay close attention to grounds in 
order to remain relevant.”483  She emphasizes that “abandoning grounds would weaken, rather than 
strengthen equality analysis… As long as discrimination continues to be practiced following historic 
patterns marked by grounds of discrimination, anti-discrimination law must pay close attention to 
those historic markers of the dynamics of power relationships.”484  On Pothier’s account, 
“[e]stablishing discrimination requires an explanatory link to ground(s) of discrimination. This 
connection can be done by inference, but some basis for linking conduct to grounds is still necessary 
to establish discrimination that is distinguished from simple disagreement, even between people of 
unequal power.”485   
Sheila McIntyre similarly advocates a continued reliance on grounds, with the caveat that the 
Court should be urged to presumptively apply grounds “only to those who have been subordinated on 
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that ground.”486  (Pothier seems, implicitly to share some version of this view.)  McIntyre elaborates 
that “[m]en, for instance, would only have standing to make a claim on the ground of sex, if they can 
establish how a sex-based assignment of benefits or penalties shores up male (or race or ageist or 
heterosexist) domination.”487  McIntyre declines to endorse a departure from a grounds-based focus 
since “[w]e need the grounds to illuminate who oppresses whom systematically.”488  The grounds, in 
her view, allow a focus on “how a law reinforces structural inequalities in two directions, by further 
dispossessing those already deprived by specific relations of oppression…while increasing the unjust 
enrichment of the oppressor group(s).”489 
Daphne Gilbert, conversely, endorses Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s group-based focus on 
disadvantage, arguing that it is better able to account for conditions of group disadvantage, address 
intersectional claims, and allow claimants to self-identify and “illustrate a particular history or 
practice of oppression.”490  In Gilbert’s view, “Looking at the group does not require contextual 
abandonment. Looking at the ground, however, may require just that.”491  Gilbert argues that, 
“L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s group-based approach is, at its core, relational and her concern is for the 
interaction between advantaged and disadvantaged members of society. Skipping over the 
identification of grounds does not mean denying the value of group history or context.”492  On the 
contrary, Gilbert argues, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s “analysis of the group with whom the claimant 
identified would inevitably consider whether that group was disadvantaged. It would, by necessity, 
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consider context (social, historic, cultural, economic) in an effort to put the discrimination analysis 
front and centre.”493 
Elsewhere, I have suggested that there is no essential disagreement between the groups and 
grounds camps in this Canadian debate. 494  Both argue that attending to the context of oppressive 
power relationships, accounting for intersectional discrimination claims, and attention to the 
claimant’s perspective, are the proper functions of this initial inquiry (whether cast in terms of groups 
or grounds.)  Neither of the sides in this debate argues that attention to disadvantage or power 
differentials should be abandoned in favour of a formal analysis that would favour the sorts of 
outcomes arising in the U.S. affirmative action context. 495  While the “groups” analysis advanced by 
Gilbert may resemble the “class” analysis endorsed by Oh and Rubenfeld, the ‘grounds’ analysis 
endorsed by Pothier and McIntyre bears no relation to the “classification” analysis that Oh and 
Rubenfeld criticize.  The ostensible choice between groups and grounds, or classes and 
classifications, does not adequately explain what is at stake in these debates.    
A Relational Turn 
 In the preceding sections, we have seen two very different sets of debates surrounding the 
proper role of groups/grounds and class(ification) in the U.S. and Canadian contexts.  Both the 
Canadian and American scholarly conversations engage in very different ways the kinds of legal 
meanings that might be relevant to these doctrinal invitations to consider categories of difference.    
We have seen that in the U.S. context, class-based analysis is generally cast as the approach 
most amenable to advancing anti-subordination principles.  Fiss has suggested that the reification of 
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social groups that may attend a focus on classes is a necessary evil if we are to construct an equal 
protection analysis that attends to social context.  Suspect classification is set out as the alternative to 
suspect classes, and is criticized by Oh and Rubenfeld as distraction from the oppressive 
relationships which ought to be the concern of equal protection law.   
The Canadian groups/grounds debate identified here takes a very different form.  A shared 
concern over substantive equality is cast as being best served either by attention to social groups or 
by attention to grounds of discrimination.  Both groups and grounds are advanced in this debate as 
the best means of providing a nuanced picture of the historical, social, and political context of 
equality claims.  In contrast to these approaches, the current Canadian test for new analogous 
grounds focuses on (constructively) immutable personal characteristics, a symmetrical and 
decontextualized approach that arguably shares some aspects of the U.S. classification analysis.  We 
have seen, for example, that Oh’s criticism of the linguistic abstractions entailed by U.S. suspect 
classification is echoed in Dixon’s concerns over analogical abstraction invited by the Canadian 
Court’s immutability test. 
There is a certain conceptual parallel between grounds and classifications (such as race), and 
groups and classes (such as African Americans).  But the Canadian and American debates reveal thus 
different assumptions about the relational implications of attending to one analytic mode over the 
other.  This conceptual confusion over what attention to groups or classes might entail (as opposed to 
attention to grounds or classifications), points to a significant analytical division that is obscured by 
the language of “groups” and “grounds” or “classes” and “classifications.”  This deeper fissure is 
illuminated by the relational theoretic insights explored in Chapter 1. 
In Chapter 1, we learned that relational theorists have called for legal approaches that attend 
to the centrality of relationships in people’s lives; that acknowledge and contest social constructions 
of difference; and that avoid a reflexive reliance on categories that risk obscuring the relationships 
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that give rise to legal conflicts.  The groups/grounds and class(ification) inquiries serve in their 
respective jurisdictions as the first step in framing equality problems.  This initial framing has the 
potential to embody the insights of relational theory by creating doctrinal space for attention to the 
social relationships giving rise to a claim.  This initial framing also, however, has the potential to 
produce categorical approaches to difference that ignore or masks those relationships.  It is these two 
possibilities that I wish to draw out here: relational framing on the one hand, and categorical framing 
on the other.  In my view, the distinction between relational and categorical framing better describes 
the underlying differences animating the debates currently expressed through the doctrinal rubric of 
groups/grounds and class(ification).  
Before returning to the American and Canadian doctrinal debates, however, I will elaborate 
the relational and categorical approaches to framing equality problems that I see underlying these 
debates.  A relational framing focuses on the social relationships relevant to assessing an equality 
claim.  These may be multiple, and may engage the social and legal significance of either particular 
classes or particular classifications.  Such a focus considers the actual histories of the groups and 
individuals involved.  The word “groups” in this description is to be understood not as connoting 
naturalized or necessary cohorts, but rather as embracing a more fluid conception of interpersonal 
and structural associations.  On the broad account of relational context which I invoke, any 
associational matrix relevant to a claim may constitute the kind of group I have in mind.  Children 
living in a San Antonio school district with a low property-tax base may be a relevant group.496  The 
fact that these children are largely members of other relevant social groupings that we might refer to 
variously as “poor” or “minority” or “school children” may also be important elements of the 
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relational context of a claim.497  It may also be relevant to identify the potential for complex or 
intersectional discrimination arising from these facts.498  The precise boundaries of groups, and the 
ease of identifying membership in groups, are not important to assessing relational context.  
Relational context, rather, is concerned with unearthing and understanding the social relationships, 
which may or may not be easily described with reference to popularly or judicially recognized 
categories.   
Conversely, a categorical framing zeroes in on the classes or classifications relevant to a 
claim, seeking to label and sort those groups or grounds.  What matters to a categorical framing are 
not the specifics of the individuals or groups involved, but rather whether their experiences can be 
described with reference to categories which have been used before, or will be easy to use again.  
Because ease of defining and sorting the groups or grounds is essential, recourse to abstract 
reasoning is more important than examination of the unique social matrices that are engaged by a 
claim.  What matters about the children living in a San Antonio school district with low property 
taxes is whether there is a label that can accurately and abstractly describe the group in a manner 
consistent with other abstract labels.  Factors like “immutability” and abstract conceptions of 
“relevancy” are attractive to a categorical approach to the extent that they strip away particularities 
that are unique to the claim or claimants.  A category, once recognized, is hardened; a label, once 
affixed, is permanent.   
We can understand the debates over groups/grounds and class(ification) differently once we 
reconceptualise this moment of initial framing as attending to either category or relationship.  
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Beginning with the Canadian debate between Pothier and McIntyre and Gilbert and Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, we see that the language of groups and grounds has produced an artificial or 
superficial disagreement that obscures the essential similarity of their proposals.  All parties to this 
conversation are seeking means of framing equality claims in relational terms.  While Gilbert and 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé focus their doctrinal arguments on the need to identify and describe 
disadvantaged groups, it is clear that the underlying concern is to illuminate the relationships relevant 
to equality claims.  Their focus is on creating doctrinal space in which to describe history and 
context, rather than on identifying the particular group in question.  In fact, the nature and definition 
of “groups” is a subject which receives little attention from either Gilbert or Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, 
despite their ostensible focus on groups.  On the other side of the coin, Pothier and McIntyre’s 
doctrinal prescription to attend to grounds is similarly rooted in a desire to begin equality analysis 
with a relational framing.  Again, the calls for a focus on grounds like “race” and “sex” are explicitly 
rooted in a concern to illuminate the power relationships at stake—there is no interest expressed by 
these authors in creating abstract links between these “grounds,” or assigning to them relevance 
beyond their role as “historic markers of the dynamics of power relationships.”499 
This academic debate over groups and grounds thus focuses on a linguistic distinction that 
fails to identify what is actually at stake in the differing approaches.  This confusion is exacerbated 
by the fact that the Court’s use of the terms groups and grounds is not faithful to the meanings 
attributed to these words in the academic debate set out above.  The Court’s jurisprudence in the 
Andrews era frequently deployed the language of “grounds” (in fact terming its framework the 
“enumerated and analogous grounds approach”) while clearly attending to the relational concerns 
that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé would later associate with a focus on groups.  Justice L’Heureux-
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Dubé’s call to focus on groups, moreover was expressly attentive to the “historic patterns marked by 
grounds of discrimination” that Pothier and McIntyre associate with grounds.    
The grounds analysis set out by the Canadian Supreme Court in Law and Corbiere, however, 
represent a true turn towards the categorical framing that I have set out in opposition to the relational 
approach shared by the participants in the groups/grounds debate.  An analytic focus on immutability 
evokes an intrinsic notion of difference, located within the individual.  The Court’s turn to 
immutability recalls the assumptions—challenged by relational theory—that categories of difference 
are given, and adopts the attendant view that relevant differences are essential and intrinsic.  The 
exercise the Court is called upon to engage in is one of sorting and categorizing, rather than assessing 
the broader relationships that might have produced certain differences as socially relevant.  Again, 
the groups/grounds linguistic divide does not help us to understand this shift in focus.   
The different reasons offered in Corbiere by the majority as opposed to the concurring 
opinion of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé illustrate this problem.  The Corbiere majority, as set out above, 
proposed a grounds analysis focused on the (constructive) immutability of personal characteristics, 
and repeatedly emphasized that the Court’s findings on analogousness in a given case must constitute 
enduring categories to be applied in future cases.500  While the Court’s decision was clearly aimed at 
the circumstances of a particular “group”—off-reserve band members—the “grounds” analysis 
deployed focused on differences as intrinsic to the group members (i.e. immutability), rather than 
produced in the context of a broader web of social relationships.  By the time Corbiere was decided, 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had joined the unanimous Law Court in accepting the language of 
“grounds” to describe the doctrinal framing for which she had previously urged a focus on 
                                               
500 See notes 399 to 403, supra, and accompanying text. 
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“groups.”501  But her discussion of grounds remained anchored in relational rather than categorical 
approaches to framing cases before the Court.  Unlike the Cobiere majority, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
rejected the possibility that the (constructive) immutability of personal characteristics could stand as 
the lone indicator of analogousness, holding that no single indicator was “necessary,” and 
maintaining as a distinct basis of analogousness cases wherein “those defined by the characteristic 
are lacking in political power, disadvantaged, or vulnerable to becoming disadvantaged or having 
their interests overlooked.”502  For Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, the grounds inquiry is not a categorical, 
list-making exercise: “if indicia of an analogous ground are not present in general, or among a certain 
group in Canadian society, they may nevertheless be present in another social or legislative context, 
within a different group in Canadian society, or in a given geographic area, to give only a few 
examples.”503    
A categorical approach or a relational approach thus might equally be brought to groups or to 
grounds—the choice between groups and grounds as analytic tools misrepresents what is at stake: a 
choice between relational or categorical framing.  Questions about sex or race as grounds might call 
for relational interrogations into how these classifications have been deployed to produce and 
entrench oppressive social relationships.  Or questions about these grounds might call for 
essentializing assessments of abstract aspects of these traits.  Similarly, a focus on groups might call 
for questions about the material and social relationships experienced by their members; but it might 
just as easily treat the relevant differences as asocial and intrinsic.  A doctrinal call to attend to 
relationships must be just that—efforts to achieve that goal with reference to proxies like “groups” or 
“grounds” risk missing the mark about why groups and grounds matter.  They risk missing the 
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503 Ibid at para 61. 
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opportunity that groups and grounds analyses might provide to frame equality claims in their 
relational context. 
The role that “classification” analysis has played in the American affirmative action 
jurisprudence reveals a very different discursive landscape than that in which the Canadian 
groups/grounds debate has unfurled.  In the U.S. context, the rise of a classification approach has in 
fact been intimately associated with a turn to categorical framing, and an abandonment of attention to 
the relational context of equality claims—particularly in affirmative action cases.  As noted earlier in 
this chapter, Oh and Rubenfeld’s alignment of “classes” with the advancement of an anti-
subordination agenda is directly responsive to the Court’s use of “classifications” to frustrate efforts 
to ameliorate conditions of disadvantage.   
As with the deployment of “grounds” in the Canadian context, however, attention to 
“classes” does not necessarily invite a relational approach, or avoid categorical thinking.  Young, 
Smith, and Ford point out that even a focus on classes risks a jurisprudence fraught with hardened 
and essentialized group categories.504  Moreover, as we have seen in Rodriguez, a focus on groups 
can very easily slip into a categorical inquiry into the size or diffuseness of the group, rather than a 
relational inquiry into the social context of a claim.505   
In the U.S. context in particular, attention to groups at the stage of identifying suspect classes 
cannot undo the essentially categorical nature of the Court’s approach to heightened scrutiny once a 
class is recognized.  Under the Court’s current approach, once a suspect class is recognized, 
heightened scrutiny necessarily attaches to all distinctions based on that classification.  As Rubenfeld 
has noted, this produces a fundamental instability as between the identification of suspect “classes” 
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(to the extent that this term invokes relational attention to disadvantage), and the symmetrical and 
categorical application of heightened scrutiny to all future distinctions that rely on that 
“classification.”506  Whatever relational framing may arise from the analysis by which a suspect class 
is identified necessarily dissolves into a process of categorical sorting in subsequent cases.  
Moreover, since the balance of the Court’s equal protection analysis focuses on a narrow conception 
of rationality (with varying degrees of ‘fit’ required depending on the suspectness of the 
classification), there is effectively no further doctrinal space for relational considerations once they 
have been excised from this initial framing.507     
In both Canada and the U.S., moreover, the jurisprudence has revolved around a list-making 
process that necessarily invites categorical framings.  Since the Canadian Supreme Court has now 
confirmed an abstract grounds inquiry whose results will hold in all future cases, it has followed the 
U.S. in creating a fixed list of characteristics warranting special constitutional protection.  The 
pluralism anxiety that Yoshino identifies is in part animated by a categorical stance towards the 
framing of equality claims.  The Court’s concern about proliferating groups, as expressed by the 
majority of the Court in Cleburne, arises from the fact that the inquiry is focused on general rules for 
sorting and classification, not on analyzing the instant claim in light of its relational context. 
The alternative approaches advocated by Canadian Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, and U.S. 
Justices Marshall and Stevens each offer possible means of introducing greater doctrinal space for 
relational framing.  While their precise focuses differ, all three justices eschew the list-making 
qualities that have dominated the prevailing approaches in their respective courts.  On all three 
approaches, the initial framing of equality claims is not about naming groups or identifying grounds, 
                                               
506 Golberg, supra note 197, also refers to this “deeply rooted conflict” at 504. 
507 As set out above, Justice Stevens’ special approach to rationality avoids this problem.  See notes 320 to 
323, supra, and accompanying text. 
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but is rather on identifying a constellation of factors that illuminate the relationships at stake in a 
claim.  Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s inquiry into the nature of the groups and interests affected attends 
to the social position of the claimant.  Justice Marshall’s focus on the character of the classification 
in question and the relative importance of the benefit to those discriminated against again requires 
attention to the actual relational context of the particular claim.  Justice Stevens foregoes the initial 
“framing” moment evident in the other approaches discussed, but incorporates relational 
considerations into the substance of his analysis by introducing a proportionality-style rationality 
assessment, considering the severity of the impact on those affected in light of their relational 
circumstances.  Under all three approaches, the more relational framing is unencumbered by fears of 
a growing “list” of classes or classifications that will have to be applied categorically in future cases 
regardless of the actual relational context of those cases. 
Furthermore, by eschewing list-making categorical approaches, these Justices are well 
positioned to consider a variety of relationships that may be relevant to a claim—a quality that makes 
them particularly well-suited to claims of intersectional discrimination.  The dominant approaches in 
the U.S. and Canadian courts hinge on identifying a ground or classification; this is a very different 
kind of inquiry than a broad search for relevant relationships.  As discussed above in relation to the 
Rodriguez example, any number of classes or classifications might be relevant to framing a claim in 
relational terms.  Understanding the circumstances of such classes as children, low-income families, 
and racial minorities may be illuminating, as might the social significance of such classifications as 
age, race, and class.  The more relational approaches of Canadian Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, and U.S. 
Justices Marshall and Stevens create space for considering these factors in every case.  In contrast, 
the majorities’ approaches to groups and grounds, classes and classifications, only creates some 
limited space for these considerations when new grounds are raised.  In cases that subsequently 
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engage the resultant judicial categories, however, the Court retreats to a pattern of sorting and listing 
that crowds out relational framing. 
The approaches of Canadian Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, and U.S. Justices Marshall and 
Stevens are thus more amenable to the kinds of doctrinal approaches that have been advanced in the 
relational literature.  We have seen that Sheppard calls for an approach to discrimination wherein 
“individual experiences (the micro-level) need to be connected to larger societal and group-based 
realities (the meso and macro-levels).” 508  Sheppard urges that such multi-levelled analyses 
“implicate a socially situated individual and are enhanced by a broad contextual inquiry that 
addresses individual stories, institutional relations, systemic practices, and larger structural and 
societal patterns of inequality and exclusion.”509  Similarly, Jennifer Nedelsky has advocated a 
general approach to rights adjudication that begins with a directive to “examine the rights dispute to 
determine what is structuring the relations that have generated the problem.”510  In the statutory 
human rights context, Duclos has argued that “Discrimination ought to be assessed in light of three 
interrelated considerations: the characteristics of the people involved (race, gender, and so on), their 
relationship and the conduct arising out of it, and the larger social context within which that 
relationship is located.”511   
Observing the particular problems that a categorical approach creates for new groups, or 
groups based on intersecting grounds not captured by existing categories, Duclos urges that, “[f]or 
racial minority women and for others who straddle the current categories of difference, complicating 
our human rights law in the ways I have suggested is not one of several options for reform. It is the 
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only way not to disappear.”512  A focus on categories practically necessitates such disappearing, and 
not just in cases of intersectional discrimination.  Legal claims involve real people in real 
relationships; legal doctrines that fail to attend to that truth necessarily disappear aspects of the 
claimants and their circumstances.  Relationships are complex, multiple, and interlocking in ways 
that categorical approaches cannot accommodate.  Categories ask us to abstract, to list, and to sort 
experiences, not to listen for what is really there.      
Debates over groups and grounds, classes and classifications, risk obscuring the essential 
opportunity that these doctrinal moments open up for framing equality claims in relational terms.  
The opportunity is lost when these doctrinal spaces are colonized by categorical approaches that 
replace attention to context and specificity with attention to abstraction and list-making.  In order to 
truly illuminate what is at stake in these debates, the focus must remain squarely on the extent to 
which these doctrinal openings are deployed to frame claims in relational rather than categorical 
terms.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
As set out in the introduction to this paper, questions as to “which characteristics…ought to 
be protected against discrimination” are among the most commonly deployed means of defining the 
scope of equality protections.513  I have suggested here that these doctrinal questions create an 
opportunity to infuse equality analysis with relational concerns.  I have focused on the ways that this 
opportunity has been seized or lost in two jurisdictions that have quite different approaches to their 
constitutional equality guarantees.  I have argued that debates in these jurisdictions regarding the role 
of groups and grounds, classes and classifications, are more productively cast in terms that 
emphasize the possibilities for relational framing of equality claims—and conversely, the risk that 
categorical framings may crowd out these relational insights. 
At the beginning of this paper, I suggested that the insights of relational theory might offer us 
“ways out” of apparently intractable doctrinal problems—in particular, how we might attend to the 
realities of social context without provoking the spectre of endless “groups” seeking special status 
from the courts.  I have proposed that relational theory illuminates the power of attention to 
relationships as an alternative to attention to categories.  The “way out” is to disassociate doctrinal 
attention to context from the drive to categorize.   
Writing in the South African context, Albertyn and Goldblatt have explained that relational 
scholars have called for “an equality jurisprudence which places difference and disadvantage at the 
centre of the concept.  They point to the importance of the relationship of the individual to the group 
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and the often complicated and intersectional nature of inequalities that are found in reality.  They 
insist on the remedial purpose of the right and the contextual nature of its determination.”514  Among 
the greatest challenges facing relational theorists is the difficult work of translating these aspirations 
into prescriptions—a task which in many cases requires an initial act of translation between theory 
and doctrine.  This paper has been an effort towards such a project—untangling the linguistic and 
conceptual confusion surrounding groups and grounds, and the relational aspirations that might be 
expressed in a doctrinal moment that is common to many jurisdictions.  It is one small piece of a 
grander relational project that must necessarily be comprised of small pieces: “to shift habits of 
thought so that people routinely attend to the relations of interconnection that shape human 
experience, create problems, and constitute solutions…in everyday conversation, in scholarship, in 
policy making, and in legal interpretation.”515 
  
                                               
514 Albertyn and Goldblatt, supra note 38 at 253.  Note that Albertyn and Goldblatt refer to the same body of 
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